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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report follows up on recent NRC-sponsored phenomena identification and ranking table 
(PIRT) exercises for the next generation nuclear plant (NGNP) and is intended to identify the 
significant “gaps” between what is needed and what is already available to NRC to adequately assess 
NGNP safety characteristics.  Building on the PIRT efforts, this task goes a step further by 
incorporating evaluations of accident sequences and risk to determine important gaps in the 
knowledge base and further to recommend how these gaps might be addressed.  Report sections are 
typically organized to first provide a background and summary of what is needed, next identify what 
data and tools are available, and finally describe the gaps.  This information is of interest to NRC 
assessments of the confirmatory research and development (R&D) needs for NGNP licensing.  Gap 
analyses are based in part on the set of phenomena determined in the PIRT processes to be of high 
importance and have a low or medium knowledge level, with evaluations of accident sequence risk 
factored in also. 
The scope of this report covers six areas or categories, where many phenomena involved are 
cross-cutting.  They are 
1. accidents and thermal fluids,  
2. reactor physics and neutronics (including criticality calculations and experiments), 
3. fuel performance and fission product transport (FPT) and dose, 
4. high-temperature materials (metallic), 
5. graphite, and 
6. process heat for hydrogen production. 
Some recommendations are categorized for either near- or long-term implementation.  This is, in 
part, in recognition of the fact that the NGNP design is still in the early stages of definition and 
development, and some emphasis on research needs is expected to change as the design matures. 
The most significant gaps in the accident and thermal-fluids area have been identified as  
1. core coolant bypass flow (normal operation), 
2. core effective thermal conductivity [depressurized loss of forced circulation (D-LOFC)],  
3. reactor cavity cooling system (RCCS) performance [during loss of forced circulation 
(LOFC)], and  
4. confinement with reactor cavity air ingress (air ingress accident). 
In the physics or neutronics area, there were no gaps found to be of high importance to safety; 
however, there were a number of items identified and described in some detail that would require 
especially careful attention to detail within the normal design and testing program. 
The major FPT phenomena of interest identified in the PIRT exercise are also covered in this 
report.  The primary issues relate to current uncertainties in confinement design (which have a major 
impact on “gap priorities”), fission product (FP) releases via normal helium leakage, and dust-borne 
releases and deleterious effects of mechanical shock and vibrations during rapid discharge in 
postulated D-LOFC accidents which could cause additional releases of FPs that would have otherwise 
been retained within the primary system. 
The following significant gaps were identified in the NGNP reactor high-temperature materials 
area (other than graphite) and corresponded directly to those identified in the PIRT exercise: 
  x
• for the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), crack initiation and subcritical crack growth, 
surface emissivity, and loss of desired surface layer and other property degradation; 
• aging and fatigue leading to degradation of insulation materials; 
• intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) crack initiation and propagation; 
• structural design methods for control rod composites; 
• in-vessel surface emissivities and irradiation-induced creep; 
• structural design and fabrication of composites; and 
• valve failure in high-temperature conditions. 
Significant gaps identified for graphite components were found in the following areas, also 
corresponding directly to those identified by the PIRT panel: 
• graphite supply uncertainties and inconsistencies; 
• confirmatory data for new grades to be used in NGNP; 
• irradiation creep data and effect of creep on properties; 
• consensus design codes and standards; 
• extension of current theoretical performance models to higher doses and temperatures; 
• development of whole-core structural models and nondestructive examination (NDE) 
methods; and 
• analytical models for oxidation, property changes, and dimensional changes with creep 
induced by irradiation. 
For the high-temperature process heat systems (for hydrogen production), model development 
will be required once the hydrogen plant design is specified.  The application of engineering 
judgment and lessons learned from nonnuclear chemical plant experience is needed to eliminate or 
minimize the possibility of accidents affecting both the reactor and the process plant.  Potential 
phenomena resulting from process plant interface with the reactor are highly design dependent.  As 
was also concluded in the PIRT study, the design selections should be guided to eliminate or 
minimize the phenomena that can adversely affect reactor safety. 
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ABSTRACT 
As a follow-up to the phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) studies conducted 
recently by NRC on next generation nuclear plant (NGNP) safety, a study was conducted to identify 
the significant “gaps” between what is needed and what is already available to adequately assess 
NGNP safety characteristics.  The PIRT studies focused on identifying important phenomena 
affecting NGNP plant behavior, while the gap study gives more attention to off-normal behavior, 
uncertainties, and event probabilities under both normal operation and postulated accident conditions.  
Hence, this process also involved incorporating more detailed evaluations of accident sequences and 
risk assessments.  This study considers thermal-fluid and neutronic behavior under both normal and 
postulated accident conditions, fission product transport (FPT), high-temperature metals, and graphite 
behavior and their effects on safety.  In addition, safety issues related to coupling process heat 
(hydrogen production) systems to the reactor are addressed, given the limited design information 
currently available.  Recommendations for further study, including analytical methods development 
and experimental needs, are presented as appropriate in each of these areas. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The physical processes governing the behavior of high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs) 
are complex and in many ways differ considerably from those of light-water reactors (LWRs).  Part of 
the process of evaluating HTGR safety characteristics is the understanding of phenomena involved, 
along with the models developed to predict behavior in both normal and accident situations.  Another 
significant part of the evaluation process is identifying those areas in which gaps remain between 
what is needed to conduct comprehensive safety analysis vs what is available to the analyst, including 
operationally validated models with adequate supporting data.  Reductions in the uncertainties in the 
analysis models and data would result in a reduction of the thermal margins required to make the 
safety case.  Gap reduction assessments are addressed for both near- and long-term needs. 
The phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) process has been applied by the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to the current body of information about the U.S. 
Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP—assumed to be a modular 
HTGR), considering both the prismatic and pebble-bed core design options.   
Figure 1 (below) shows examples of the two types of NGNP reactor cores—prismatic and pebble 
bed. 
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Fig. 1.  NGNP reactor core options—Prismatic (L) and Pebble Bed (R). 
Five PIRT teams recently evaluated phenomena in the following areas: accidents, including 
thermal fluids (T/F) and neutronics; fission product transport (FPT) and dose; high-temperature 
metallic materials; graphite; and high-temperature process heat utilization for hydrogen production.  
This PIRT activity is documented in the six volumes of NUREG/CR-6944 [1-1].  Prior to that 
exercise, a PIRT process was conducted for the key phenomena pertinent to TRISO-coated particle 
fuel (to be used in the NGNP), documented in NUREG/CR-6844 [1-2].  Both activities provided 
assessments of importance and knowledge level rankings for significant phenomena.  
The reader is encouraged to read the PIRT main reports as well as the additional volumes 
providing more details of the individual PIRTs. 
REFERENCES 
1-1. S. J. Ball and S. E. Fisher, Next Generation Nuclear Plant Phenomena Identification and 
Ranking Tables (PIRTs)—Volume 1:  Main Report, NUREG/CR-6944, Vol. 1 (ORNL/TM-
2007/147, Vol. 1), Oak Ridge National Laboratory, March 2008 (and additional volumes). 
1-2. R. N. Morris et al., TRISO-Coated Particle Fuel Phenomenon Identification and Ranking 
Tables (PIRTs) for Fission Product Transport Due to Manufacturing, Operations, and 
Accidents—Main Report, NUREG/CR-6844, Vol. 1, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC, July 2004 (and additional volumes). 
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2. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE 
Building on previous PIRT studies, the objective of this report is to go a step further by 
incorporating evaluations of accident sequences and risk to identify gaps in the knowledge base and 
to recommend how significant gaps should be addressed.  Report sections are typically organized to 
first provide a background and summary of what is needed, next identify what options are available, 
and finally describe what is missing (“the gap”) and how to fill it.  This information is critical to NRC 
assessment of the confirmatory research and development (R&D) needs for NGNP licensing.  Gaps in 
the knowledge base and suggested approaches for filling them will be based in part on the set of 
phenomena determined in the PIRT processes to be of high importance and have a low or medium 
knowledge level.  Evaluations of accident sequence risk will be factored in also. 
The scope of this report covers six areas or categories of phenomena, processes, or characteristics 
(hereafter referred to as “phenomena”).  Unquestionably, many phenomena are cross-cutting, and 
these cross-cuts are addressed in individual sections.  The following categorization is made for the 
purposes of report organization to address the important phenomena.  They are 
1. accidents and thermal fluids, 
2. reactor physics and neutronics (including criticality calculations and experiments), 
3. fuel performance and FPT and dose, 
4. high-temperature materials (metallic), 
5. graphite, and 
6. process heat for hydrogen production. 
It is recognized that helium purification and spent fuel storage systems could also become source 
terms in certain events; however, they are not covered in this report.  Some recommendations are 
categorized for either near- or long-term implementation.  This is due in part to the fact that the 
NGNP is still in the early stages of definition and development, and the emphasis on research needs is 
expected to change as the design matures and becomes more specific. 
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3. ACCIDENT AND THERMAL-FLUIDS (T/F) PHENOMENA 
This section provides a background on modular HTGR accident and T/F characteristics, 
emphasizing the phenomena that need to be addressed in accident codes.  Most of these issues are 
addressed adequately in existing codes used by the world’s major HTGR programs, but there are 
some areas where, in general, more work is needed.  These areas will be identified as gaps, and some 
recommendations on how the gaps might be filled will be offered where applicable. 
This section will cover topics based on challenges to four fundamental safety functions, as 
follows: 
• heat removal, 
• reactivity control, 
• confinement of radioactivity, and 
• control of chemical attacks. 
Some neutronics and FPT issues are also identified where appropriate to the accident analysis, but 
Sects. 4 and 5 will address those specific areas in more detail.   
Safety-related heat removal involves timely and sufficient cooling of the fuel elements, the core, 
the reactor vessel, and the reactor cavity (including vessel supports, the cavity concrete liner, and 
other equipment), accomplished by a combination of conduction, convection, and thermal radiation 
processes.  The sufficiency of heat removal is judged primarily by its prevention of failures of the 
barriers to fission product (FP) release. The heat removal processes during loss-of-forced circulation 
(LOFC) accident conditions are typically all accommodated by passive means. 
Inherent reactivity control is accomplished to a great extent by the negative temperature-
dependent reactivity feedback for the fuel, moderator, and reflectors throughout the entire operating 
(and accident) temperature range, and for the full range of the fuel burn-up cycle.  Active reactivity 
control is provided by control rods, shutdown rods, and a reserve shutdown system.  The phenomena 
and safety-related issues associated with these inherent and active systems are addressed in more 
detail in Sect. 4. 
Confinement of radioactivity is provided primarily by the TRISO fuel particle coatings and fuel 
element graphite but also by the primary system vessels and piping, the reactor cavity confinement 
structures, and filters on vents from the reactor cavity and confinement, where applicable.  Crucial 
phenomena associated with FPT are addressed in detail in Sect. 5. 
Control of chemical attacks is also provided by the confinement barriers listed above in limiting 
the quantity of air that can ingress into the reactor core during a break in the primary system 
boundary.  In addition, by design, sources of water ingress during normal operation are limited by 
maintaining a higher pressure of the primary coolant helium.  However, attention must be given to the 
administrative controls to limit water sources that may ingress during depressurized shutdown 
operations such as refueling.  In this study, it is assumed that there is no steam generator connected 
directly to the primary circuit. 
3.1 MAJOR PHENOMENA AND PROCESSES OF INTEREST 
The most significant accident T/F phenomena rated as high importance with low or medium 
knowledge level are listed in Table 7 of the PIRT Main Report [3-1].  Of these, the primary 
phenomena of interest (i.e., the recommended primary focus for gaps in this category) are 
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1. core coolant bypass flow (normal operation), 
2. core effective thermal conductivity [depressurized loss-of-forced circulation (D-LOFC)], 
3. reactor cavity cooling system (RCCS) performance (during LOFCs), and 
4. confinement with reactor cavity air ingress (air ingress accident). 
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL AND ANALYTICAL MODELING ASPECTS OF 
PHENOMENA—BACKGROUND 
One of the simplifying aspects of modeling graphite-moderated gas-cooled reactor accidents is 
that there is no need for two-phase in-core flow models. Also, in the vast majority of severe accident 
cases, physical geometries do not change (i.e., there are no fuel melting or relocation phenomena as in 
the case of severe accidents in water-cooled and liquid-metal-cooled reactors).  On the other hand, an 
unfortunate aspect of modeling HTGRs is that there is always a scarcity of in-core temperature and 
flux measurements (as compared to water-cooled reactors, which have significant in-core 
instrumentation) to validate the models.  Thus, the reactor core thermal analyst faces uncertainties and 
questions about model accuracy and validity, albeit on systems that respond much more slowly (both 
thermally and neutronically) and typically have much greater thermal margins as compared to light-
water reactors (LWRs).  
Standard core heat transfer algorithms and correlations are available for predictions of heat 
transfer in HTGR cores and have been used for decades in analyzing gas-cooled reactor design and 
operation.  The NGNP, with its reliance on passive safety, will most likely use codes that include 
validated conduction, radiation (now with more emphasis on this mode due to the higher temperatures 
involved), and convection models for heat transfer. 
As the vendor strategy is developed and matures, the NRC will parallel its own strategy along 
with its needs for confirmatory safety-related validation data.  In this vein, it is recommended that as 
the designer/vendor prepares validation studies, the NRC should be aware of these studies as they are 
ongoing to ensure that the phenomena of most interest are well covered.  
The following sections summarize the recommended features and potential (needed) 
improvements for accident codes covering T/F and neutronic behavior, including chemical attack 
scenarios. 
3.2.1 T/F and Neutronic Accident Analysis Code Attributes 
Accident codes typically model the core T/F and neutronic behavior in both steady-state and 
transient conditions.  At present, these codes normally use two-dimensional or three-dimensional T/F 
models of the reactor core.  The use of a multidimensional model is needed to simulate the 
temperature profiles and flow distributions in tall cylindrical annular cores, particularly when local or 
asymmetric effects are important.  In pressurized loss-of-forced circulation (P-LOFC) accidents, for 
example, there are significant recirculation (bidirectional) flows within the core.  Characterization of 
hot plumes exiting the top of the core depends on these flow rates.  In transient analyses, point 
kinetics approximations are often used for the neutronics because the three-dimensional flux shape 
transient effects in the core during postulated accidents (other than rod ejections) are relatively small, 
especially when compared to those in LWRs.  Multidimensional neutronic codes are necessary for 
providing steady-state power peaking distributions for accident codes that use point- or 1-D neutronic 
models.  For anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) events, the dynamics of xenon-135 and 
samarium-149 poisoning may need to be considered.  These models are sometimes also used in 
combination with the overall-system T/F codes. 
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The following is an annotated “checklist” covering some of the recommended features for 
accident simulation codes, especially noting those features needed when coupling the neutronics to 
multidimensional T/F core simulations. 
Accident Simulation Codes—Recommended T/F Features 
• Include dose- and temperature-dependent graphite thermal properties, noting the 
relatively high core effective thermal conductivity (with large uncertainties), and 
consideration of annealing effects, particularly in prismatic cores, during long-term heat-
ups (especially in D-LOFC accidents). 
• Incorporate effective temperature-dependent core thermal conductivity for pebble-bed 
reactors (PBRs). 
• Model reactor pressure vessel (RPV) heat removal in LOFC events by the RCCS, where 
most (typically ~70–90%) of the heat transferred from the RPV to the RCCS is by 
thermal radiation, and the balance is by natural convection of the reactor cavity air. 
• Consider natural circulation (air) heat transport in the reactor cavity.  Even though most 
of the heat is transferred to the RCCS by thermal radiation, the distribution of heat and 
temperatures within the cavity (especially at the cavity ceiling adjacent to RPV 
penetrations for control rods) is affected by convection terms. 
• The RCCS has important safety functions within the design bases and, therefore, should 
be carefully modeled and coupled to the RPV and core T/F models (refer to NRC General 
Design Criteria for residual heat removal, emergency core cooling, and containment 
cooling). 
• Include maximum fuel temperature plus time-at-temperature calculations (two critical 
limiting factors) for all fuel regions, providing inputs to fuel failure models to estimate 
source terms. 
• Consider core pressure drop correlations (particularly for the pebble bed)—standardized 
and well-documented correlations are available, at least for operating flow regimes, 
showing that the pressure drop is very sensitive to assumed packing fractions of the 
pebbles. 
• Consider core heat transfer algorithms—correlations are generally available for the 
prediction of heat transfer in HTGR cores, and these include conduction, radiation, and 
convection, both at normal (operating) and LOFC conditions. 
• Model the changes of flow (and flow direction) within the core, including recirculation 
within the core in P-LOFC accidents. 
• The modular HTGR core is relatively large, so from the fuel zones to the RPV there are 
large temperature gradients.  There are also large thermal gradients in the lower reflector 
and core support blocks due to nonuniformities in radial power density profiles, coolant 
flows, and coolant temperatures.  Likewise there are many other coolant flow paths 
within the RPV, with significant flows typically bypassing the fuel regions.  The amount 
of bypass flow is difficult to estimate due to variations in gap sizes (due to irregularities, 
thermal gradients, and irradiation-induced deformations).  Bypass flows can have 
significant effects on maximum fuel temperatures during operation.  For fast transients, 
especially, detailed temperature profiles of the fuel and graphite should be taken into 
account for thermal stress calculations. 
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Accident Simulation Codes—Recommended Neutronic features 
• The afterheat (total and spatial distribution) as a function of time after shutdown is a 
critical parameter in calculating maximum fuel temperatures during LOFC accidents.  
Typically, afterheat correlations rely mostly on calculations for the long-term estimates. 
• Negative temperature-reactivity feedback coefficients for the fuel, moderator, and 
reflectors are temperature and burn-up dependent, with potentially positive coefficients 
for the heat-up of the central reflector. 
• Neutronic codes need to account for core heterogeneity.  To obtain accurate resonance 
self-shielding of the cross sections, it may be necessary to model the detailed 
heterogeneity of the fuel.  For example, in pebble beds, the fuel particles should not be 
smeared into the graphite matrix, and there should be a capability for handling cross 
sections dependent on temperature. 
• The code should account for the time dependence of xenon-135 and samarium-149 
poisoning effects for ATWS cases. 
• The analysis should account for the effect of asymmetrical control rod movements and 
xenon-135 oscillations. 
• While significant reactivity insertion accident (RIA) events are not considered to be 
likely in current modular HTGR concepts, they cannot be ruled out entirely until the 
designs are finalized.  The neutronic codes may be needed to model these types of events. 
• In the case of steam (direct) cycle designs, the effects of water ingress on reactivity and 
control rod worth need to be included, since potentially large amounts of steam or water 
could enter the core during power operation. 
3.2.2 Whole-Plant Modeling Codes 
There are several important design features related to the whole-plant transient T/F behavior of 
modular HTGRs that should be modeled. 
• The coupled dynamic helium flow and heat transfer in the core, the turbine(s) and 
compressor(s), the recuperator, the helium/water heat exchangers (or steam-generator 
system) balance of plant (BOP), and/or the helium circulator and associated intermediate 
heat exchanger (IHX) supplying the chemical processing (or other) plants.  A model of 
the shutdown cooling system (SCS) is also required. 
• To model the primary circuit with the BOP, the code should be capable of simulating a 
one-dimensional helium flow network, including the capability to model changes in flow 
direction in some accidents. 
• For accident studies involving a complete loss of flow through the BOP, the BOP 
dynamic response can usually be ignored, except for estimating system pressure changes 
in the P-LOFC accidents. 
3.2.3 Confinement Analysis Codes 
Confinement analysis codes are needed to calculate pressure, temperature, and gas composition 
transients in the reactor-cavity confinement space(s) during depressurization accidents involving 
eventual air ingress into the RPV and core.  If subdivided, the confinement compartments and the 
paths between compartments are typically modeled by nodes with given volumes and junction 
characteristics.  Gas compositions calculated in the compartment(s) account for air, helium, products 
of oxidation, and steam (for water-ingress accidents).  Gas temperatures and compositions in the 
vicinity of the primary system breach are used to determine subsequent ingress flows into the reactor 
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core.  Considerations are made for air in-leakage to confinement space(s) and for any special 
injections of inert gas or flow retardants (by the operators) during recovery from a long-term accident.   
For cases assuming damage caused by a rapid depressurization, changes in compartment or 
junction characteristics or relief valve sealing capability would need to be modeled.  A large pressure 
pulse could damage the RCCS, reducing cooling capabilities and/or opening up another release path 
both for air/water ingress into the reactor cavity, as well as for possible FPT out to the environment. 
There are significant differences between loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) in a largely steam 
atmosphere in LWRs and a largely inert gas atmosphere in HTGRs.  One difference is due to the lack 
of a phase change (condensation) in cooling high-temperature helium as compared to steam, thus 
increasing the importance of gas heating and cooling effects from direct contact of the helium with 
the confinement structures.  As a result, a depressurization accident in the case of a sealed (“airtight”) 
containment could retain the high pressure for a very long time, thus providing a significant driving 
force for subsequent discharges of the entrapped gas, which may become more contaminated as the 
accident progresses.  This potential accident sequence is a major factor in the (much-preferred) design 
selection of a vented confinement over a sealed containment building. 
Aerosol and dust generation and transport would also be different if the confinement system was 
dry rather than wet, and building filters would have to operate (and survive) at high temperatures.  
Organic forms of iodine can challenge filter designers when confronted with varying conditions.  
Aerosol and dust issues are covered in detail in Sect. 5.2.3.8. 
3.2.4 Codes Dealing with Chemical Reactions 
Special code features are required to simulate chemical reactions due to air and possibly for 
water/steam ingress into the core.  These models need to work in conjunction with T/F codes and (for 
the water ingress) with codes that simulate the neutronics, due to possible steam/water effects on 
reactivity for ATWS cases.  Chemical reactions may also result in additional releases from damaged 
fuel, or failure of fuel damaged by a temperature transient, or in possible release of FPs absorbed in 
the graphite structures. 
In air ingress accident scenarios, it is typically assumed that a D-LOFC is followed by ingress of 
ambient air or mixed gasses from the reactor-cavity confinement space into the primary system at the 
point of the break, with eventual transport through the primary system to the core.  This may occur 
either just after the depressurization is complete (to ambient pressure) or later.  The oxidation of core 
graphite that follows generates heat (and CO2), in addition to the afterheat, and the gas flows upward 
in the core and can subsequently provide some convective cooling (or heating).  CO2 entering the 
mid-to-upper part of the core is likely to encounter higher temperatures that cause an endothermic 
(Boudouard) reaction with core graphite and produces CO.  Large-scale oxidation of the core graphite 
could cause structural damage and expose fuel to chemical attack.  The change in the reactor 
atmosphere from reducing to oxidizing may affect the plate-out of FPs onto the metal components.  
These FPs could then be entrained in the convective flow and eventually exit the RPV. 
Graphite oxidation models rely on data for specific types of graphite and their irradiation 
histories.  For lower temperature ranges, the oxidation rates are determined by the chemically 
controlled rate, while at higher temperatures, the process is usually mass-transfer limited.  These 
important distinctions must be included in the modeling.  Oxidation of graphite at lower temperatures 
is more likely to cause structural damage. 
Key factors are the net airflow rate into the RPV and core area, and ultimately the “availability” 
of fresh air (oxygen) over the course of the accident.  The net airflow through the core is strongly 
dependent on the buoyancy forces due to differential temperatures and composition and to the flow 
resistances in the core and at the break(s).  Other scenarios that involve forced air convection (such as 
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by operation of the SCS circulator) have the potential to cause much more damage, or at least to 
increase oxidation rates until the available oxygen is depleted.  
For a single break or opening in the primary system, calculations and confirmatory experiments 
have shown that it may take a long time (days) before a significant natural circulation net air inflow 
into the core is established.  This process involves molecular diffusion of air, eventually into the 
helium-filled top region of the reactor vessel.  For a much less likely case of a double break in the 
vessel that allows ambient air access to both the top and bottom of the core, a chimney-like 
configuration would promote a higher net ingress flow that would be established more quickly than in 
the case of a single break. 
Experiments have shown that SiC TRISO fuel is resistant to failures from exposure to air at 
temperatures below ~1300–1400ºC [3-2].  In typical air ingress accident scenarios following a single-
break D-LOFC, calculations show that oxidation is typically limited to the lower areas of the core 
where the temperatures are much less than ~1300 ºC, so FP releases even in severe ingress sequences 
may be limited. 
Water and steam ingress modeling has many similarities to air ingress, as both have corrosive 
effects on the graphite and can cause structural and fuel damage.  Water/steam reactions at high 
temperatures are endothermic, however, rather than exothermic.  Modular HTGR cores are typically 
under-moderated, so steam/water mixtures entering the core are likely to increase reactivity, which 
could then cause significant power increases if the accident also assumes an ATWS, with subsequent 
recriticality of the core, so fuel damage could occur with potentially significant power surges.   
Since the water-cooled heat exchangers in direct-cycle gas-turbine designs typically keep water-
side pressures lower than the primary helium pressure (except during shutdown), water/steam ingress 
accidents are usually only of concern for the (direct) steam-cycle plants, where steam pressures are 
much higher.  However, water ingress is not impossible just because the cooling water pressure is 
normally lower than the reactor operating pressure.  Water could still enter the high-pressure core 
through pump action, or if the break allows the water source to pressurize in a vertical configuration 
(water supported by gas), in which case instabilities could drive the water into the core. 
Due to the wide range of uncertainties in terms of possible ingress rates and total ingress 
quantities for both air and steam/water cases, parametric (scoping) studies are recommended.   
In summary, for codes that model chemical attack, consideration should be given to 
• chemical reactions between graphite and air/steam; 
• coupling between T/F codes and chemical kinetics models; 
• formation of gases and aerosols containing FPs; 
• details of the confinement holdup volumes, flow paths, and stratification; 
• graphite FP inventories prior to the accident; 
• reactions between the released FPs and the oxidizing nature of the gas flow; 
• local fuel temperatures and the potential for an aggressive chemical environment which 
may increase fuel failures and failed fuel releases of FPs; and 
• data available on TRISO fuel failure in oxidizing atmospheres. 
3.3 CLOSING THE GAPS—STAGES OF MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
The following areas have been identified as those in which gaps remain between what is needed 
for sufficient safety analysis vs what is generally available in the form of operationally validated 
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models with adequate supporting data.  Reductions in the uncertainties in these models and data 
generally result in a reduction of the margins required to make an adequate safety case. 
3.3.1 Near-Term Approaches 
Core-Coolant Bypass Flow Phenomena (Normal Operation) 
The modular HTGR core is relatively large for its power level and operates at very high 
temperatures.  Thus from the fuel zone (radially) to the RPV there are large temperature gradients.  
Likewise there are many coolant flow paths within the RPV, with significant flows that can bypass 
the fuel regions (a power-to-flow ratio concern).  The amount of bypass-flow is difficult to estimate 
because of variations in gap sizes (due to thermal gradients, manufacturing, and irradiation-induced 
deformations and gaps).  Bypass-flow can have a significant effect on maximum fuel temperatures 
during operation.   
If core coolant bypass-flows and channel bypass-flow are to be better characterized, an overall 
understanding of the specific design aspects that affect this phenomenon is needed.  This may include 
a more complete understanding and accounting of block bowing for the graphite used for fuel [for 
prismatic-core modular reactors (PMRs)] and reflectors in the core barrel configuration.  Some 
instrumented testing of models of stacked blocks could be undertaken to better understand the 
phenomena.  Large temperature redistribution transients were seen at the Fort St. Vrain reactor due to 
shifting columns of fuel blocks; however, the configuration in the Fort St. Vrain core was different 
from current PMR designs since a flow-control orifice over each set of seven columns of fuel was 
used, and each column of fuel blocks was shorter than in current designs. 
One proposed NGNP PMR fuel block design has an overlapping, around-the-edge lip of graphite 
on the bottom of the block and chamfered edges on the top of the block that would provide a radial 
flow-retarding interlock, in addition to the dowel pins and holes used to provide inter-block 
connections for axial stability.  Without in-core testing, it may be difficult to know how these 
differences would impact column stability. 
Given the existing T/F codes, it is possible to perform a parametric analysis on gap configurations 
(with assumed tolerances and worst cases defined).  This may help bound the questions associated 
with gap and bypass flows and the phenomena of shifting blocks. 
Effective Core Thermal Conductivity 
For prismatic cores, it is suggested that dose and temperature-dependent graphite thermal 
properties (especially thermal conductivity) be made available to the NRC T/F code suite. This is to 
account for large uncertainties, as well as for characterization of annealing effects during long-term 
heat-up D-LOFC accidents.   
There are also considerable error bounds in effective core thermal conductivity (as a function of 
both temperature and irradiation) for pebble bed cores.  The correlations available are empirical.  The 
Pebble-Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) Pty. Ltd. project has an experimental facility to be used to 
refine the database. 
Afterheat Correlations 
Peak fuel temperatures in the D-LOFC accident are very sensitive to the afterheat (vs time) to the 
same extent as they are to the core thermal conductivity function.  Afterheat correlations are sensitive 
to fuel type and burn-up histories; however, tracking fuel histories during operation can be 
challenging.  In addition, afterheat validation data is more difficult to obtain for long times after 
shutdown. 
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Core Effective Pressure Drop 
For the PBR, standardized and well-documented correlations for core pressure drop are available, 
but more conformation data may be needed for low-flow cases to better characterize flow distribution 
and plume formation (for the P-LOFC) and in-core airflow distributions during air ingress accidents.  
Data show that the pressure drop is very sensitive to assumed packing fractions of the pebbles.  So, 
here again, parametric analyses using established ranges of different packing fractions can help define 
a performance envelope.  The PBMR Pty. Ltd. project has an experimental facility to be used to 
refine pebble-bed core pressure drop correlations, but (perhaps) only at the higher flow conditions. 
RCCS Performance (During LOFC) 
The RCCS has important safety functions and needs to be simulated in detail, with its 
predominantly radiant heat transfer coupling to the RPV and other heat transfer mechanisms within 
the reactor cavity.  The RCCS functions include maintaining the reactor cavity liner concrete 
temperature below prescribed limits (typically less than 100ºC), preventing the RPV peak temperature 
from exceeding limits during LOFC events, and minimizing parasitic heat losses during normal 
operation.  While most of the heat transferred from the high-temperature RPV to the RCCS is via T4 
radiation, air convection within the cavity has a significant effect redistributing the heat. 
Models may be needed to simulate large pressure pulses in D-LOFC accidents that could damage 
the RCCS, reducing cooling and/or opening up another release path for air or water ingress to the 
reactor cavity and perhaps FPT out to the environment. 
RCCS operation and previous comparison/validation efforts for the RCCS models have 
historically been shown to be problematic and not nearly as straightforward as expected [3-3].  There 
are international research opportunities that should be taken advantage of with Japan, and perhaps 
China and South Africa, to ensure that RCCS designs can be modeled sufficiently.  Japan [high-
temperature engineering test reactor (HTTR)] and China [high-temperature reactor, 10 MW (HTR-
10)] have RCCS operating data that could be useful for model verification and validation (V&V) as 
well as practical operating experience that could be useful for design efforts.  These opportunities 
should be pursued when available, even though the basic design features of the NGNP RCCS (e.g., 
air or water cooled) have not yet been established. 
Fuel Performance Models 
Aspects of maximum fuel temperature plus time-at-temperature histories (critical limiting factors) 
for all fuel regions provide inputs to fuel failure models to determine source terms and dose-vs-
frequency estimates. This is an important cross-cutting aspect.  Chemical reactions in air (or water) 
ingress accidents which depend on temperature are also a cross-cutting item that should be included 
in the T/F codes.  See Sect. 5.2.3.1 for more details.  For fast transients, especially, detailed 
temperature profiles of the fuel and graphite should be taken into account for thermal stress 
calculations. 
Air Ingress Phenomena 
Air ingress accident scenarios are difficult to characterize because even with a well-established 
confinement design, there would be an extremely wide variety of possible accident sequence 
boundary conditions (leak size, location, operator action, etc.).  At this point, with little or no detail 
available about the confinement, only generalized studies and experiments would be practical.  
Bounding analytical studies, however, could be useful in determining positive (and negative) features 
of proposed design characteristics.  The major features of general interest would be quantification of 
long-term air in-leakage into the confinement and the mixing and stratification characteristics of gases 
in prototypical cavities within the confinement. 
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3.3.2 Intermediate- and Long-Term Approaches 
There are wide varieties of features and capabilities of the accident analysis codes currently used 
for modular HTGRs.  The range of capabilities, as well as the V&V of these codes, is important in 
determining how effectively they can be used in assessments of postulated accidents and safety cases.  
This is especially true now because of the lack of more detailed reactor designs to evaluate and the 
deficiencies in the supporting databases. 
Over the long term, addressing these gaps will evolve in parallel with the development of better 
definition and more detail in the eventual NGNP design.  The long-term goal should be to have a 
comprehensive suite of verified and validated analysis codes, agreed-upon accident cases for 
regulatory acceptance, and robust supporting databases that NRC can use for independent 
confirmatory analysis.   
Until more design details are available, significant uncertainty will remain for the types of 
accidents to be reviewed and the analytic approaches to be used.  Sensitivity studies can play an 
important role in the eventual determination of an R&D program.  Some general guidance for the 
development, V&V of accident analysis codes is provided in Sect. 6 of International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) Safety Reports Series (SRS) No. 23 [3-4] and another IAEA SRS report specific to 
modular HTGR accident analysis just released, SRS No. 54 [3-5].  Also, a new American Nuclear 
Society (ANS) safety standard (ANS 53.1) dealing with accident analysis computer codes is currently 
being developed.  
3.3.3 Summary Descriptions and Evaluations of Selected Existing Code Capabilities 
Limited information is available on the status of many of the world’s major HTGR accident codes 
in use, especially those being developed for the large programs now building modular HTGRs.  China 
and the Republic of South Africa (RSA) are developing and manufacturing major systems and 
components for complete PBR designs. Major test facilities are being employed where the 
technologies, including software development, are progressing rapidly.   
PBR simulators are being developed in China by the Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology 
(INET) at Tsinghua University in Beijing and include 3-D core T/F and overall system calculations.  
Their code suite HTRSIM is based on the standard German pebble-bed codes THERMIX and TINTE 
[3-6].  TINTE is a well-established reactor dynamics code with 2-D neutronics and thermal-fluid 
capabilities for primary loop modeling.  A block diagram of the TINTE code, as adapted by INET, is 
shown in Fig. 2.  Water and air ingress modeling has been incorporated.  INET also uses KORIGEN 
for FP inventory calculations, FRESCO2 for FP release, and LOOPHTR for primary loop 
radioactivity inventory calculations. 
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Fig. 2.  TINTE code modeling block diagram as developed by INET. 
The RSA accident analysis software is being developed using Flownet Nuclear, a commercial 
simulation package that has been adapted for PBMR accident (and operational) calculations for all 
accident sequences noted except for the air ingress accidents (under development).  The project also 
uses the German TINTE code for pebble-bed core accident calculations.  The FLUENT 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) code is used for detailed fluid-flow and heat transfer 
calculations.  The ASTEC code, jointly developed by L’Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté 
nucléaire (IRSN, France) and Gesellschaft für Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit mbH (GRS, Germany) 
for LWR severe accidents, is incorporated into the code suite to model FPT, aerosols, and 
containment/confinement T/F behavior.  
The South Korean program at the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), which 
began in 2004, has a very comprehensive accident code system for that country’s HTGR design, 
which is dedicated to hydrogen production—MARS-GCR for system design and safety analysis and 
GAMMA (Gas Mulit-component Mixture Analysis) for air ingress events.  A recent development of 
the GAMMA+ code suite includes coupling with neutronics (CAPP) and SANA for gas turbine 
modeling.  Dust, FP, and tritium modeling is combined in the MELCOR and PADLOC codes.  
MIDAS is used for FPT analysis and LILAC for detailed computational fluid dynamics (CFD) 
analysis.  KAERI codes are adapted to both prismatic and pebble-bed core designs. 
The Japanese code ACCORD is typically used for comprehensive reactor accident simulations 
(except air ingress).  It employs modules for nuclear calculations, heat transfer calculation of the 
reactor core, heat exchangers and piping, and flow calculations for the primary and secondary 
coolants.  The control system and safety protection system for the HTTR are incorporated in this 
code.  Reactor power is computed using a point kinetics approximation model with six delayed 
neutron groups.  The reactor core is simulated by a one-channel model with one representative fuel 
rod.  Each heat exchanger is simulated by a one-channel model with one (average) heat transfer tube. 
The TAC-NC code is also used as a two-dimensional and time-dependent thermal analysis code 
for safety evaluations of the large JAEA (JAERI) HTGR designs and has been applied to benchmark 
calculations of the 10-MW(t) high-temperature (HTR-10, China) using a R-Z cylindrical calculation 
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model.  The region of the calculation model is from the center of the reactor core to the water-cooling 
panel outside the insulating plates of reactor cavity for the radial direction, and from the top air cavity 
to the bottom air cavity outside the RPV for the axial direction.  TAC-NC code improvements were 
made to consider ATWS calculations.  A point kinetics model with six delayed neutron groups with 
xenon poisoning is used.  For PBRs, the reactor core is modified as a smeared model including 
pebble-bed balls and helium coolant.  
Russian codes GTAS-M and DUPT (by OKBM) are the major ones used for accident 
simulations.  GTAS calculates core thermal hydraulics in 2-D (R-Z geometry) using energy equations 
for porous media.  Flow equations are solved using quasi-stationary 1-D approximations for each 
channel.  GTAS is used for D-LOFC and P-LOFC accidents as well.  Heat transfer in the reactor 
cavity due to radiation and convection is calculated by a simplified model.  The GTMHR code 
platform [3-7] is used for analysis of transients, and  its mathematical models encompass all major 
reactor plant elements, including point kinetics with a reactivity control system and heat transfer in 
the core with fuel assemblies made up of hexahedral blocks.  Models of the turbomachine with 
associated heat exchangers, valves, and control systems are included as well.  The major models have 
been verified by comparing analysis results with experiments and other analytical solutions.  
Russian calculations of helium–air mixtures in the primary circuit and in the containment or 
confinement vault after depressurization are done using the RPK and MACEX codes. The RPK code 
calculates helium outflow parameters during depressurization, as well as helium–air mixture 
parameters in the primary circuit and containment, accounting for gas displacement afterwards with 
temperature variation and vault air leakages.  The MACEX code is used to calculate helium–air 
convective and diffusion mass transfer through tubes.  The code implements dynamic equations for 
2-D concentration diffusion, momentum, continuity, and gas composition.  Code verification 
exercises used experiments that were performed at specially created test facilities [3-8].  GTAS code 
verification also made use of benchmarking exercises in an IAEA coordinated research project—
CRP-3 [3-3]. 
In The Netherlands, the Nuclear Research Group (NRG) has developed the PANTHERMIX code, 
which combines THERMIX-DIREKT (from FZJ), a 2-D (R-Z) HTR thermal fluids accident code for 
PBRs, with PANTHER models developed at NRG that can incorporate 3-D neutronics.  RELAP-5 is 
also incorporated for full-system simulations.  Also under development is the SPECTRA code, which 
will incorporate dust contamination estimation. 
The AREVA program (U.S.) has developed a comprehensive HTGR accident simulator for 
ANTARES [3-9] and uses the MANTA code for more detailed core 3-D design issues.  
For accident analyses, the coupled thermal hydraulic and chemical reactions code 
REACT/THERMIX is applied.  The coupled code consists of three modules—THERMIX, 
KONVEK, and REACT.  The THERMIX module is a general purpose steady-state or transient two-
dimensional heat conduction module that calculates temperatures in the structures.  The two-
dimensional quasi steady-state convection module KONVEK calculates the temperature and flow 
distribution of the fluid.  The two-dimensional quasi steady-state reaction module REACT calculates 
gas concentrations, reaction heat, and graphite burn-off in the case of air ingress accidents.  In 
general, the calculation employ two-dimensional symmetric models in (r, z) geometry, covering the 
whole reactor in its cavity, including the RCCS.   
Other U.S. codes in common use are PEBBED [3-10] [Idaho National Laboratory (INL)] and 
GRSAC [3-11] [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)].   
PEBBED is a 3-D core simulator developed at INL specifically for PBR design and analysis.  It 
converges directly upon the asymptotic or equilibrium fuel cycle using an integrated neutron 
diffusion–depletion solver.  Core design optimization is performed using a genetic algorithm 
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operating on core geometry and pebble flow parameters.  Core temperature profiles are obtained 
using a one-dimensional embedded T/F solver or with coupled THERMIX or RELAP calculations.  
THERMIX is a 2-D (R-Z) heat transfer and gas dynamics code developed for the German PBR 
program.  It is part of the Very Superior Old Program (VSOP) PBR fuel cycle analysis system [3-12]; 
however, the THERMIX module has been extracted recently for use with many other codes.  
THERMIX contains material properties and correlations validated for PBR analysis under the 
German programs.  PBMR (Pty. Ltd.) uses a modified version of VSOP with THERMIX for their 
reactor design and fuel cycle analyses [3-13]. 
The Graphite Reactor Severe Accident Code (GRSAC) development, use, and validation 
exercises began over 30 years ago at ORNL with several predecessor codes.  Current interest in 
GRSAC involves the development of confinement models for air ingress accident modeling, 
simulation of accident scenarios for modular HTGR designs, and simulation of benchmark transients 
run on the HTTR (Japan) and HTR-10 (China).  GRSAC employs a fairly detailed (~3000 nodes) 3-D 
thermal-hydraulics model for the core, plus models for the reactor vessel, SCS, and RCCS.  There are 
options to include ATWS accidents using a point kinetics model and to model air ingress accidents, 
simulating the oxidation of core graphite. 
In general, all these codes typically use the universally available data for all aspects of the 
simulation but with widely varying levels of detail and simulation methodologies.  Brief descriptions 
of the codes used by IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) participants can be found in 
TECDOC reports of CRP-3 and CRP-5 [3-3, 3-14].  A more detailed description and tabulation of 
modular HTGR accident codes is in an NRC letter report (in publication) [3-15]. 
3.4 SUMMARY 
The primary areas in accident T/F analysis where there are significant gaps between what is 
needed vs what is available have been identified as  
1. core coolant bypass flow (normal operation), 
2. core effective thermal conductivity (D-LOFC),  
3. RCCS performance (during LOFC), and 
4. confinement with reactor cavity air ingress (air ingress accident). 
The extent of the concern and the need for more R&D in these areas depend on the eventual 
NGNP design, including the extent of built-in safety margins.  It is likely that all NGNP designers are 
cognizant of these concerns and are factoring in mitigating attributes. 
In the PIRT main report section on accident and T/F analysis [3-1], a number of phenomena were 
identified in the “normal operation” category as high importance and low knowledge [H, L], namely, 
core bypass flows, core flux/power profiles, temperature-reactivity feedback functions, outlet plenum 
flow distribution, fuel performance, and silver (Ag-110m) release.  Of these, only the first (bypass 
flows) was identified in this gap report as needing special regulatory attention.  This is because the 
core flux/power profiles and temperature-reactivity feedback functions, while important, can 
normally be calculated with sufficient accuracy to ensure safe operation, and in some cases confirmed 
by measurement or test.  These are among the many features of modular HTGRs that require 
allowances for considerable margins for error to ensure operating conditions do not adversely affect 
plant systems and components.  Core outlet plenum flow distribution phenomena, while important to 
considerations such as temperature gradients and fluctuations seen by equipment downstream (e.g., 
the gas turbine), are not considered to be a safety concern.  Silver release (and plateout) is a 
maintenance dose concern, particularly for direct-cycle gas turbine designs. 
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In the LOFC categories, only RCCS performance features were rated in the PIRT as critical 
[H, L].  These were, specifically, emissivities of the RCCS panels and RPV outside surfaces and the 
convection and heat transfer characteristics of circulating air in the reactor cavity.  While these 
parameters would affect RPV and vessel support peak temperatures, they would have only minimal 
effect on peak fuel temperatures.  This report recommended special attention be given to effective 
core conductivity and afterheat functions (in D-LOFC accidents) since peak fuel temperatures are 
very sensitive to these values. 
In reactivity (ATWS) and air ingress accidents, there was corresponding emphasis put on crucial 
parameters (temperature-reactivity feedback functions and gas ingress rate and oxygen availability, 
respectively) in the two reports. 
As a follow-on to a gap analysis, existing codes should be evaluated on the basis of how well they 
model the key processes and incorporate the needed attributes into a single package.  For example, 
accident T/F analysis codes should ideally be linked with fuel performance and FPT models to obtain 
estimates of the source term, enabling the analyst to obtain a clear figure of merit.  Such linkages 
would enable parametric (sensitivity) analyses to be run with predicted source terms generated, 
providing quantitative risk-informed research guidance. 
The long-term goal here is to have a comprehensive suite of verified and validated analysis codes, 
agreed-to postulated accident cases for regulatory acceptance, and a robust supporting database that 
NRC can use for independent analysis of candidate plant and confinement designs and options. 
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4. REACTOR PHYSICS  
While there are some gaps in reactor physics experimental data, as discussed further below, there 
are no significant gaps in reactor physics analysis capabilities and databases currently available in 
vendor codes to model the neutronics aspects of the proposed NGNP concepts.  However, special 
attention should be given to the following. 
In preparing multigroup or few-group cross sections for discrete-ordinates transport theory 
analyses or diffusion theory analyses, the cross section processing codes should be able to incorporate 
properly the effect of double and possibly triple heterogeneities in calculating the resonance integrals 
for the coated particle fuel.  The capability to calculate resonance integrals accounting for the neutron 
flux depression due to the overlap of other resonance absorbers in the fuel is also important.  In 
preparing few-group cross sections in the thermal energy spectrum, cross section processing codes 
should also account for the resonance broadening in isotopes with thermal resonances and the self-
shielding effects of double or triple heterogeneities due to the spatial depressions in the thermal-
neutron energy spectra.  Monte Carlo codes using continuous-energy cross sections should be able to 
handle the probability distributions associated with randomly distributed coated fuel particles in the 
fuel compacts so that double and/or triple heterogeneities are addressed. 
Since the stability of cores to xenon-135 oscillations can be assessed more readily if the 
eigenvalues and flux eigenfunctions of the first and second harmonics can be calculated using 
diffusion theory [4-1], the capability is needed to calculate these higher order harmonics.  The 
difference in the fundamental mode and first harmonic eigenvalues can be used to evaluate the so-
called λ-mode stability and, thereby, used to judge the susceptibility of the core to either axial or 
azimuthal xenon-135-induced oscillations for the burn-up and for controlling critical rod positions as 
a function of core life [4-2].  The use of these harmonic flux distribution results in the axial or 
azimuthal dimensions would be useful for quasi-static analyses of reactor kinetics calculations of the 
slower xenon-135 transient, with control rod motion and thermal feedback effects included, or in 
more simplified two-node point kinetics models of the core with node-dependent feedbacks. 
As noted above, there are some gaps in the experimental data such as adequate measurements of 
the core operating temperature and the combined reactivity effects of high temperature and the 
reactivity contributions of FPs such as xenon-135.  Fissionable production products such as 
plutonium-239 and plutonium-240 also affect the temperature-dependent coefficients of reactivity.  
As discussed in detail in this section, good data on these effects are both hard to measure and have 
typically not been measured with sufficient defensible rigor or relevance in past experiments or tests.  
Near in-core (temporary) measurements may be feasible in PMR designs utilizing inner reflector 
control rod penetrations.  Temporary flux, pressure drop, and temperature measurements were made 
in the Fort St. Vrain reactor utilizing an instrumentation package that was substituted for a control 
rod.  Attention should be paid to current testing in the HTR-10 and HTTR and to the development of 
high-temperature sensors and neutron detectors that can be used in the first unit of the NGNP.  
Without adequate instrumentation there will be limited test data, and the interpretation of start-up 
physics test results will end up being highly dependent on calculated, as opposed to measured, data.  
This has been the case for many past HTGRs,  Documentation of experiment-to-calculation analyses 
of key reactor physics parameters is important in demonstrating the safety margins of the reactor [see 
Sect. 4.3 of Ref. 4-3 and Appendix A, respectively, in Refs. 4-4 and 4-5]. 
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4.1 MAJOR PHENOMENA OF INTEREST 
4.1.1 Background in Selection of Phenomena 
In both the fuel PIRT [4-6] and the current PIRT [4-7], several accidents were considered that 
were based on assumed reactivity-driven or power-distribution-affected scenarios.  The fuel PIRT 
considered the following two accidents of this type:  
• reactivity insertion based on the effect of rod ejection in the PMR, given excess 
reactivities representative of that in a PBMR but applied to conditions in the PBR, 
combining reactivity and power-distribution effects; and 
• power pulse of several seconds in duration, a reactivity-driven effect. 
The current T/F-accident PIRT considered the “challenge to reactivity control” as one of the 
groupings for phenomena based on challenges to fundamental safety functions.  As background 
during the PIRT panel deliberations, and as discussed in Sect. 4.1.2 below, the PIRT panel 
considered both events at the Fort St. Vrain reactor that impacted the operability of reactivity control 
systems, and results from the NRC preapplication review of the DOE modular high-temperature gas-
cooled reactor (MHTGR) [4-3] that related to the potential recriticality during an extended loss-of-
cooling event.  In addition to the accident scenarios identified in the fuel PIRT, there were three 
additional scenarios of this type that were considered in the current PIRT based on past plant 
operating experience: 
• restart and operation of the reactor following an undetected major water ingress during 
shutdown, a reactivity-driven effect; 
• restart and operation of the PMR following refueling with an incorrect positioning of 
fresh fuel such as reverse loading, which should be observable in the expected critical 
position of control rods and impact on peak fuel temperature during operation, combining 
reactivity and power-distribution effects; and 
• impact of control rod misalignment on power peaking and initiation of azimuthal or axial 
xenon oscillations with subsequent power peaking, and the subsequent impacts on peak 
fuel temperatures during operation, combining reactivity and power-distribution effects.  
The PIRT tables in the main report list and provide the expert opinion on specific phenomena of 
interest.  Those with a high-to-medium importance rating with a low-to-medium knowledge level are 
listed as follows: 
• the time-dependence and spatial distribution of decay heat as a major factor in 
determining the maximum fuel temperature during a D-LOFC [importance—high; 
knowledge level—medium, or (H, M)]; 
• temperature-dependent reactivity feedback coefficients as affecting core transient 
behavior (H, M/L); 
• temperature-dependent reactivity feedback coefficients (fuel, moderator, reflectors) as 
affecting passive safety shutdown characteristics (H, M/L); 
• power and flux profiles as initial conditions for accidents involving potential fuel failures 
(H, M); 
• positive reactivity insertion and reduction in control worth due to steam-water ingress 
accidents (H, M); 
• control and shutdown rod worth and reserve shutdown worth as required for hot and cold 
shutdown (H, M) ; 
• sudden positive reactivity insertion due to pebble core compaction (packing fraction) due 
to earthquake (M, M); 
• xenon-135 buildup and oscillation as affecting core transient behavior (M, M); and 
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• xenon-135 and samarium-149 buildup and worth as affecting time to recriticality during 
loss of cooling with ATWS (M, M). 
4.1.2 Design Aspects That Impact Neutronic Phenomena 
Both the PMR and the PBR are characterized by similar reactor physics design aspects that 
impact or define the phenomena associated with power level, power distribution, and reactivity 
control, including shutdown margins.  These key design aspects include the following. 
Tall, Thin, Annular Cores with Inner and Outer Radial Reflectors 
This type of core tends to be neutronically de-coupled axially and azimuthally in spite of the long 
neutron diffusion length.  The impact of control rod misalignments on xenon-135 oscillation and 
potential stability problems needs to be quantified during start-up testing.  The fuel loadings of PMRs 
and PBRs are accomplished by very different means, but in both cases the measures used attempt to 
have axial power peaked near the top of the down-flow cores, so the higher power occurs where the 
coolant temperature is low, limiting the peak operating fuel temperature.  The PMR achieves this by 
varying the axial fuel loading and by using burnable poisons if required.  The major issue for the 
PMR is whether improper axial-loading of fuel blocks during refueling can lead to an undetected 
power distribution anomaly and result in excessive operating fuel temperatures.   
In the PBR, the on-line refueling system loads the fresh pebbles and acceptably lower burned, 
xenon-decayed recycled pebbles into the top of the core to enhance a top-peaked power distribution.  
However, in the PBR, the radial and azimuthal power distributions in the mixed-fuel pebble bed are 
not well known, and there are indications from melt-wire tests conducted in the Atomgemeinschaft 
Versuchs Reaktor (AVR) in Germany suggesting that pebbles near the walls of the reflector 
experienced unexpectedly high fuel temperatures.   
For tests at both PMRs and PBRs, consideration should be given (at least in the first core) to use 
of high-temperature “in-core” neutron detectors that can provide maps of axial and azimuthal power 
distributions and core-inner-to-outer-radius power tilts; these detectors would likely be located only 
in the inner and outer reflectors rather than in the core due to temperature and connection limitations. 
Active Reactivity Control and Shutdown Systems Where Control Poisons are Inserted into 
Penetrations in The Outer and Inner Reflectors 
In both the PMR and PBR, control rod misalignments in the outer reflector during operation 
would result in azimuthal power tilting that could cause xenon-135-induced oscillations when the 
misalignment is corrected; however, this needs to be verified by analysis and confirmed by test.  In 
both the PMR and PBR, hot shutdown is to be achieved by inserting the outer reflector control and 
shutdown rods.  In the PMR, cold shutdown is to be achieved additionally by inserting the inner 
reflector control and shutdown rods.  As a back-up shutdown system, the reserve shutdown systems 
(RSS), consisting of small boronated (B4C) graphite balls in hoppers located above the core, can be 
actuated (manually) to drop the balls into reflector penetrations.   
In the PBR, shutdown is typically achieved with the outer reflector rods inserted (for hot 
shutdown) and then with the additional actuation of the RSS into the inner reflector penetrations for 
cold shutdown.  Based on the most recent information provided to NRC [4-8] by PBMR (Pty Ltd.), 
the South African version of the PBR has no inner reflector control and shutdown rods and relies 
solely upon actuation of the RSS consisting of small absorber spheres (SAS) inserted into holes in the 
inner reflector.  The current version of the Chinese PBR [high-temperature reactor, power module 
(HTR-PM)] has a smaller cylindrical core (as opposed to annular) and will use only outer reflector 
control and shutdown elements.  
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The restart recriticality of the core to begin heat-up on nuclear heat differs between the PMR and 
the currently proposed South African PBR.  Cold recriticality in the PMR is achieved by withdrawing 
the inner reflector rods until criticality is achieved, while the PBMR, as most recently presented to 
NRC, will partially de-fuel, remove the RSS material, and then achieve recriticality for nuclear heat-
up by an as-yet undefined combination of on-line refueling and withdrawal of the outer reflector 
control rods. 
A Neutronically Transparent Single-Phase Coolant (Helium) 
The helium coolant contributes virtually nothing directly to core temperature reactivity 
coefficients, unlike both water-cooled and sodium-cooled reactors wherein changes in coolant density 
or voiding can directly affect the neutronic balance and cause large reactivity feedbacks.  Replacing 
helium with air during an air-ingress event will introduce nitrogen that should have only a small 
negative reactivity effect due to the relatively large thermal neutron capture cross section (~1.84 barns 
per atom) of the low-density nitrogen in air.  
Replacing helium with a hydrogen-bearing compound such as in a steam/water ingress event may 
produce a more pronounced positive reactivity effect that varies both with the amount and density of 
water introduced, and between PMRs and PBRs.  Steam/water ingress tends to have a positive 
reactivity effect due to increased neutron moderation and reduced neutron leakage up until and if the 
ingress amount is sufficiently large that the macroscopic thermal neutron capture cross section of 
hydrogen (0.33 barns per atom) in water overwhelms the positive effects of increased neutron 
moderation and reduced neutron leakage with parasitic capture of the thermal neutrons.   
As to the neutronic difference between the PMR and PBR, the PBR will have a higher carbon-to-
fissile-isotope atomic ratio such that the PBR is more highly moderated, so that in general the 
steam/water ingress reactivity effect is likely to be smaller than in the less-well-moderated PMR. 
However, the PBR would be more susceptible to the negative effect of hydrogen parasitic capture 
during a large water-ingress such as flooding of the core.  In addition, since water ingress, and to a 
lesser extent steam ingress, into the core and control element penetrations in the radial reflectors, will 
tend to de-couple the core from the externally inserted control poison by reducing neutron leakage 
from the core, this reduces the effectiveness of radially mounted control poisons, hence reducing the 
hot and cold shutdown reactivity margins.   
The positive reactivity effects of water ingress during shutdown would be seen first in an earlier-
than-expected criticality during restart, if not detected beforehand by moisture detectors.  However, 
even if detected early, the use of nuclear heat would be the only efficient means to dry the graphite 
fuel and reflector elements, other than completely unloading the core’s fuel and removable reflector 
blocks, which in this case would not allow affected reflector graphite external to the core to dry. 
A Solid, High-Temperature Ceramic Neutron-Moderator and Reflector (Graphite and/or 
Graphitized Carbon) 
The reactivity effects of air and water ingress into voids in the core and reflector graphite are 
addressed above. With a solid moderator there are no density-change effects on reactivity as in water-
moderated reactors and thus, aside from the effect of Doppler broadening of fission and capture 
resonances in the fuel, there is no temperature-dependent moderator-density effect on the down-
scattering of faster (higher-energy) neutrons to the thermal-neutron energy spectrum.  Also, with a 
higher-atomic-mass moderator such as carbon, the mean thermal energy of neutrons will be higher 
than that for hydrogen bound with oxygen in water; that is, graphite will tend to produce a “harder” 
thermal-neutron energy spectrum than would water-moderated systems at the same temperature 
(assuming no voiding in the water-moderated system).   
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Thus, the moderator temperature-dependent reactivity coefficient (MTC) in the PMR and PBR 
depends upon the change of the thermal-neutron energy spectrum with temperature caused by the 
temperature-dependent change in the thermal-neutron scattering kernel.1  The sign and magnitude of 
the MTC will depend upon how the change in the thermal-neutron energy spectrum impacts the 
relative thermal-neutron reaction-rates with 
1. parasitic neutron poisons due to low-level impurities in the moderator and fuel pellet 
binder, where capture cross sections tend to vary inversely with the velocity of the 
thermal neutron (1/v); 
2. FPs in the fuel with large thermal-neutron capture resonances such as xenon-135 and 
samarium-149, or with thermal-neutron capture resonance tails such as with 
rhodium-103; 
3. fuel isotopes with thermal fission-capture resonances such as plutonium-239 and to a 
much lesser extent uranium-235; 
4. fuel isotopes with thermal-capture resonance tails such as with plutonium-240; 
5. lumped burnable poisons such as boron pins that tend to have black flat neutron-capture 
cross sections varying little over the thermal-neutron energy spectrum; and  
6. possibly distributed burnable poisons (such as gadolinium or erbium) that would have 
thermal-resonance capture structures.  
The MTC is slightly delayed (compared to the fuel Doppler coefficient) but near-prompt during 
normal powered operation, but it can have large positive and negative contributions from the 
competing effects discussed above.  It is not possible to simulate all of these effects separately in a 
critical experiment, and difficult to do separate effects measurements in a reactor operating at power.  
The reflector contribution to the MTC during shutdown without active cooling can be a positive 
reactivity effect.   
Finally, another minor aspect of the use of graphite, instead of metallic in-core structures as in 
water-moderated reactors, is the fact that, during shutdown, the decay heat power distribution, which 
is dominated by the capture of decay gamma rays principally in the higher mass atoms with more 
electrons, is flatter than in LWRs since the decay gammas will tend to transport through the low-
density, low-atomic-mass carbon and deposit energy in the more widely dispersed, higher-density 
heavy-metal atoms in the fuel. 
Fuel Consisting of Carbon-Coated Fuel Particles Dispersed in a Graphitized Carbon Matrix 
The coated fuel particles are either relatively closely packed in pellet form, as proposed for the 
PMR, or more widely dispersed in the graphitized matrix material in the pebble, as proposed for the 
PBR.  In addition, the PMR fuel pellets may use mixtures of fissile (enriched uranium) and fertile 
(natural or depleted uranium, or thorium) coated particles and varying fissile particle enrichments.  
The diameters of fuel kernels usually vary inversely with enrichment, where the diameter decreases 
with enrichment based principally on optimizing the strength of the silicon carbide pressure vessel 
against fission gas pressure with burnup.  More highly enriched fuel kernels have a higher number of 
fissions, and the smaller particle has a stronger pressure vessel provided by the shell of the tighter 
silicon carbide coating.  Larger lower-enriched particles have fewer fissions, a lower fission rate, and 
                                                     
1As used here the word “kernel” refers to the common usage by physicists in referring to the thermal 
neutron scattering probability distribution for a neutron to be scattered to another thermal energy where that 
probability distribution depends on the energy of the incident neutron, the mass and temperature (vibration 
frequency) of the atom off which the neutron scatters, and the physical restraint of the scattering atom based on 
its compounding or crystalline lattice bonds to other adjacent atoms.  Elsewhere, the term “kernel” usually 
refers to the inner fuel portion of a coated fuel particle.  Therefore, the use and meaning of the word “kernel” in 
a reactor physics discussion of PMRs or PBRs depends on context. 
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more volume in the fuel kernels to accommodate FP swelling, so the larger-diameter but weaker 
silicon carbide shell is adequate for the lower fission gas pressure.   
These double or, in the case of the fissile/fertile two-particle system, triple heterogeneities must 
be accounted for in calculating the neutron reaction self-shielding effects in both the resonance or 
epithermal region and the thermal region of the neutron energy spectrum to properly calculate the 
Doppler fuel temperature coefficient of reactivity and the MTC.  The mix of fertile and fissile 
particles in a two-particle system is selected to optimize the reactivity lifetime of the PMR fuel cycle 
and the utilization of the plutonium produced during the life of the fuel elements over several cycles. 
Alternative Means to Accommodate ATWS  
Typical of gas-cooled reactors throughout the world, the control rod drives for the PMR and PBR 
usually consist of control rods suspended on cables that are wound and unwound from an electric-
motor-driven winch, where a scram consists of releasing the motor to let the winch unwind the cable 
as gravity pulls the rods into the reflector penetrations.   
The RSS is, as described above, a set of hoppers with remotely actuated drop doors located above 
the core and with each hopper filled with small boronated balls.  
Water-ingress events experienced at Fort St. Vrain led to two partial-ATWS events caused by 
moisture and particulate matter being carried through the helium purification purge system, deposited 
both on the wound cabling on the winches and on the winch motor bearings, thus preventing the free 
motion of the rods to drop into the core under gravity. Similarly at Fort St. Vrain, water-ingress 
through the helium purification system led to the leaching of the B2O3 contaminant in the B4C of the 
RSS balls, allowing the formation of boric acid crystals on the RSS balls sufficient to prevent some of 
them from falling out of the hopper during technical specifications surveillance testing.   
While preventive measures based on lessons learned can be implemented to minimize the 
possibility of ATWS by these causes that affected Fort St. Vrain, the passively safe PMR and PBR, as 
demonstrated in AVR and HTR-10 tests, can rely on the combined reactivity effects of xenon-135 
buildup, the Doppler coefficient of reactivity, and the MTC to achieve hot shutdown of the reactor 
immediately upon a loss of cooling combined with ATWS.   
During an extended loss of cooling with ATWS, the core will go critical again after the 
xenon-135 decays, and the peak fuel temperature in the recritical core will depend upon the recritical 
core power level that balances the rate of passive heat transfer out of the core to the RCCS and the 
reactivity feedbacks of the Doppler coefficient and the MTC, where the more negative the feedbacks, 
the lower the equilibrium temperature of the recritical core.   
Since the use of the term “safe shutdown” in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)—10 CFR 
part 50—imposes the requirement for subcriticality to meet regulatory requirements for hot and cold 
shutdown (see the evaluations of hot shutdown and General Design Criterion 26 in the Technical 
Evaluation Report of the Nuclear Design of the MHTGR [4-4]), the plant operator retains the safety 
function of achieving long-term hot and cold shutdown during an extended ATWS, and the 
equipment used by the operator to carry out this safety function, whether located in the control room 
or in a remote location, must be appropriately qualified to execute that safety function. 
This was an issue for DOE in the NRC preapplication review of the MHTGR [4-3] where DOE 
proposed a “walk-away-safe” design that was claimed not to require rulemaking to license but did not 
automatically scram the metallic-clad inner reflector shutdown rods to ensure long-term hot and cold 
shutdown during an extended loss-of-cooling event.  Thus, contrary to the DOE position that the 
operator had no safety function and that the RSS actuation system did not have to be qualified as 
safety related, the operator would have to actuate the RSS on a delayed basis to ensure cold shutdown 
without an uncontrolled recriticality.  If the outer reflector control and shutdown rods had failed to 
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completely insert at the beginning of the accident in the MHTGR, the operator would also have to 
actuate the RSS in the MHTGR to ensure hot shutdown in an extended loss-of-cooling accident with 
full or partial ATWS.  Therefore, if the designers of the PMR or PBR want to eliminate the safety 
function of the operator for this type of ATWS, then supporting data will likely be required to ensure 
that an uncontrolled recriticality following an accident would be acceptable. 
4.2 EXPERIMENTAL AND ANALYTICAL MODELING ASPECTS OF PHENOMENA 
Sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 of the draft Safety Evaluation Report (SER) of the steam-cycle MHTGR 
[4-3] provide the goals of the MHTGR reactor physics development and qualification program.  
Because of the greater likelihood of water ingress during operation of the proposed steam cycle 
MHTGR, additional information was needed on water ingress effects on reactivity and control rod 
worth.  Other information needs included the planned capability to detect power distribution 
anomalies, verification of the effects of plutonium buildup on the end-of-cycle temperature 
coefficients of reactivity for the low-enriched uranium (LEU) fueled core, and the uncertainties in the 
prediction and measurement of reactor physics parameters.  The NRC requested that a reactor physics 
technology development plan topical report be developed and provided for staff review prior to the 
start of licensing activities.  As discussed in Sect. 4.3.5.B of the SER, the experimental and analytical 
modeling of the MHTGR as of 1988 required additional work. 
The experimental data reviewed for the 1988 MHTGR SER [4-3] consisted of reactor data from 
Peach Bottom 1 and Fort St. Vrain and critical-experiment data obtained by Gulf General Atomics in 
the 1960s in connection with its large HTGR development program, as well as by Battelle Northwest 
Laboratories as part of a USAEC-funded program. In addition, LEU critical-experiment data from 
France (MARIUS III) and the United Kingdom (HITREX) were reviewed. Three findings were (1) 
there is a paucity of relevant experimental data; (2) there is a lack of documented analysis of the 
existing data using the analytical methods employed for the MHTGR nuclear design; and (3) 
comparisons with the British computer code WIMS-D did not provide a basis for acceptable 
validation. 
NRC staff conclusions in the SER [4-3] were based on results of the findings in the supporting 
Technical Evaluation Report of the Nuclear Design of the MHTGR [4-4].  
To assess the current planning by NGNP design proponents to address the safety-related aspects 
of reactor physics and nuclear design issues, the following documents were reviewed. 
1. DOE-HTGR-90348, Reactor Physics-Development Plan, Revision 0, December 1992 
[formerly designated as Applied Technology; this document, while submitted to NRC, 
has not been placed in the Public Document Room.  A hard copy of DOE-HTGR-90348 
was briefly reviewed by the authors of this report at the DOE Office of Scientific and 
Technical Information (OSTI) since the document had not been but now is being 
reviewed by OSTI for Official Use Only (OUO) content to authorizing public release.] 
2. DOE-HTGR-90406, MHTGR Nuclear Physics Benchmarks, Revision 0, February 1994. 
3. Section 4.0, “Reactor Physics,” FSV Experience in Support of the GT-MHR Reactor 
Physics, Fuel Performance, and Graphite, GA-A-21925 (CONF-9411153-4), General 
Atomics, November 1994. 
4. IAEA TECDOC 1249, Critical Experiments and Reactor Physics Calculations for Low-
Enriched High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Vienna, 2001. 
5. IAEA-TECDOC-1382, Evaluation of high temperature gas cooled reactor performance:  
Benchmark analysis related to initial testing of the HTTR and HTR-10, International 
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, November 2003. 
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6. ANL-05/05, Preliminary Assessment of Existing Experimental Data for Validation of 
Reactor Physics Codes and Data for NGNP Design and Analysis, Argonne and Idaho 
National Laboratories, September 15, 2004. 
7. INEEL/EXT-04-02293 Rev. 0, Next Generation Nuclear Plant—Design Methods 
Development and Validation Research and Development Program Plan, Idaho and 
Argonne National Laboratories, September 2004. 
8. Section 4.0, “NGNP Design Methods Development & Validation,” INEEL/EXT-05-
02581, Next Generation Nuclear Plant Research and Development Program Plan, Idaho, 
Oak Ridge, and Argonne National Laboratories, January 2005. 
Sections 4.0 and 5.0 of document number 7 above describe the current analytical models 
available to perform reactor physics analyses of the PMR and PBR from the preparation of nuclear 
cross sections to reactor kinetics modeling.  Section 4.2 of document number 7 and Sects. 4.1 and 4.2 
of document number 8 set out a logical set of steps for qualifying the analytical modeling of PMR and 
PBR reactor physics phenomena, given the limited amount of relevant experimental data available.  
These steps rely upon intercode comparison of neutronic benchmark calculations and analyses of 
existing experimental data from both zero-power critical experiments and power reactors.  
Unfortunately, the zero-power critical experiments performed for graphite-moderated lattices at both 
room temperature and heated conditions suffer from problems not seen in LWR experiments wherein, 
for LWR lattices, the dominant effects of the Doppler coefficient of reactivity and the moderator-
density coefficient of reactivity can be measured by separate effects testing.   
Graphite-moderated critical experiments have been harder to perform, because the earlier (1940s 
and 1950s) testing for fuel-rod lattices was primarily done with exponential, not critical, experiments, 
and the documentation for these lack detailed information about graphite impurities that contribute to 
parasitic neutron capture.  Unfortunately also, the earlier power reactor data sets from Peach Bottom 
Unit 1, Fort St. Vrain, AVR, and thorium high-temperature reactor (THTR) are for nonannular cores 
using highly enriched-uranium/thorium (HEU/Th) fuel systems that are not as relevant as more recent 
physics test data from the smaller, nonannular HTR-10 and HTTR LEU-fueled prototype 
experiments.  The initial HTTR cold critical tests, performed with a simulated annular core, are well 
documented in an IAEA TECDOC (document number 5). 
The older data sets for the gas-cooled power reactors are typically less well documented and 
therefore are of uncertain quality.  Critical-experiment data for heated testing are also of limited value 
[the Japanese very high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (VHTGR) only reached 200ºC].  The HTLTR 
tests for HEU/Th and Pu/Th systems were based on determining central region worth of a central 
heated test article in a zero-power graphite critical pile, where the spatial uniformity, or flatness, of 
the flux spectrum at the edges of the test region was based on foil activations with spectrum unfolding 
based only on two-group diffusion theory. 
While it is valuable to use the set of zero-power and power-reactor critical experiment results for 
LEU fuel to partially qualify codes and methods to be used in NGNP predictions, the uniqueness of 
the configuration (tall, thin annular core) of the current PMR and PBR designs and the high operating 
temperatures require detailed reactor physics testing of the first unit as a function of core burnup and 
of the start-ups of the second and perhaps third cycles.  Attention should be paid to the 
instrumentation needs for these tests since neutron sensors must be both distributed and 
intercalibrated to infer power distributions in the large cores.  Neutron detectors used in test 
measurements should also be sensitive enough to measure reactivity and changes in flux levels and 
distributions at neutron levels below the point of adding heat.  This avoids control rod worth 
measurement contamination by thermal feedbacks in period measurements.  There have been 
previous efforts to develop reactivity inference techniques that allow simultaneous evaluation of the 
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feedback reactivity coefficient with the rod worth measurement, but these inverse reactivity methods 
have not yet been developed sufficiently [4-9]. 
Unfortunately for the graphite-moderated gas-cooled reactors, unlike LWRs that can heat up to 
isothermal conditions at operating temperatures in the core on the combination of heat generation by 
the reactor pumps and pressurizer heaters, the PMR and PBR must heat up primarily on nuclear heat. 
Thus, in general, there will be small reactivity contributions from concentrations of xenon-135 
buildup and less than isothermal conditions in the fuel and core.   
Truly clean reactor physics testing at near-operating temperatures is likely not possible in these 
reactors if the reliance is on ex-vessel neutron detectors.  Thus in large cores, spatial redistributions of 
the neutron flux must be integrated out of the ex-core detector response to ensure a reasonably 
accurate measurement of small reactivity changes effected by the rod motion before the response is 
contaminated by temperature-dependent reactivity feedbacks.   
So for the PMR and PBR, isothermal zero-power tests of critical experiments and start-up cores 
are likely limited to low temperatures (probably less than 300ºC2).  All higher temperature and  
power-range tests on the reactors will have to be performed with well-instrumented systems to get 
more than just the critical position and inlet and outlet gas temperatures, from which all other 
reactivity effects will have to be calculated or inferred without direct measurement.   
Measuring the effects on power distributions of azimuthal rod misalignment and recovery from 
the misalignment, and the effect on xenon-135 oscillations or stability, requires intercalibrated 
neutron detectors to measure the azimuthal power response.  Interpreting the results of xenon-135 
testing likely requires either a three-dimensional time-dependent neutronics code with coupled 
thermal-hydraulic feedbacks, or a quasi-static kinetics code with a reactor physics model capable of 
calculating the first- and second-harmonic flux distributions of the fundamental mode. 
In transient analyses, point kinetics approximations are often used for the neutronics model 
because the three dimensional flux shape transient effects in the core during postulated accidents 
(other than rod ejections and possibly azimuthal or axial xenon-135 oscillations) are relatively small, 
especially when compared to those in LWRs.  Multidimensional neutronics codes are necessary for 
providing steady-state power peaking distributions for accident codes that use point-kinetics or one-
dimensional neutronics models.  For ATWS events, the dynamics of xenon-135 and samarium-149 
poisoning are considered.  These codes are sometimes also used in combination with the overall 
system T/F codes. 
4.3 CLOSING THE GAPS—STAGES OF MODEL DEVELOPMENT  
4.3.1 Near-Term Approaches 
NRC is encouraged to participate in collaboration with the Japanese HTTR and Chinese HTR-10 
test programs to plan and obtain reactor physics test data that are most relevant to the needs of 
understanding key reactor physics phenomena in the PMR and PBR: 
• isothermal MTC at higher temperatures, 
• xenon-135 worth and stability testing, 
                                                     
2 As described in Sect. 10.2.6 of the Fort St. Vrain Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, the oil-fired 
auxiliary boiler and the outside oil-fired backup auxiliary boiler could provide steam to the steam generators to 
heat up the core to slightly over 300ºC on nonnuclear heating.  The HTTR startup testing reached similar 
temperatures on heat addition from the circulators.  Higher-temperature heating of the first PMR or PBR core 
could be provided (1) if the plant is located near a high-temperature steam source such as a fossil-fired power 
plant and (2) if the steam can be routed to the shutdown cooling system heat exchanger so that nonnuclear 
heating of the core can be provided using the shutdown cooling system circulator. 
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• control rod worth and the effect of core power tilting on worth, 
• neutron detector sensitivity and thermocouple instrumentation testing at operating 
temperatures, 
• in-core power distribution measurements, 
• transient testing to benchmark kinetics codes, and 
• safety demonstration tests (including ATWS). 
4.3.2 Intermediate- and Long-Term Approaches 
NRC should continue collaborating with HTTR and HTR-10 test programs and plan with DOE 
the reactor physics startup test needs and instrumentation requirements for the NGNP.  NRC should 
consider collaboration with the U.S.–Russian Fissile Materials Disposition Program on heated critical 
experiments to be conducted in the ASTRA facility at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow. 
4.4 SUMMARY 
Past reactor physics testing of HEU/Th HTGRs is typically not relevant to the NGNP.  The 
current test plan proposed by the technology development plan for the NGNP, as documented in 
report number 8 in list in Sect. 4.2, is an acceptable start, but more planning is required for the reactor 
physics testing during NGNP start-up and the operation of the first several fuel cycles.  This is 
because zero-power testing in the facilities identified in this report is unlikely to be a satisfactory 
analog to the reactor configurations and operating temperatures of the NGNP, since these are low-
temperature, and cylindrical not annular.  More benefits would likely accrue from collaboration on 
tests in foreign programs as noted in Sect. 4.3.2. 
The listing of neutronics issues in Sect. 4.1.1 notes that in the accident–T/F PIRT exercise, there 
were no phenomena rated high importance–low knowledge [H, L], and the conclusion here is also 
that there are no very significant gaps that must be considered; however, there are several items that 
do require careful attention to detail in the design and testing programs. 
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5. FUEL AND FISSION PRODUCT TRANSPORT  
This section provides a background of modular HTGR fuel and FPT modeling and historical 
information about FPT codes and experimental V&V efforts for HTGRs.  The phenomena are 
identified, and those that need to be addressed are described for each of the significant areas identified 
in recent PIRT exercises [1-1].  Where gaps are evident, data needs are compared with the data and 
tools currently available, and potential solutions for addressing the perceived gaps are noted. 
At present, there are three required FPT model applications: 
1. Prediction of Releases from Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOOs): 10 CFR Part 
50, Appendix I, limits (for LWRs) the annual atmospheric releases to 10 milli-Rem (mR) 
gamma-ray or 20 mR beta whole-body dose and to 15 mR to any organ from all 
pathways.  This may be interpreted for the NGNP as a limitation on releases from 
operational events that on the average would occur more than once in the life of the 
reactor (>2.5 × 10-2 per reactor-year, assuming 40-year licensed lifetime, or >1.7 × 10-2 
per reactor-year, assuming 60-year licensed lifetime).  Whatever these events may be, 
models or hard data for estimating these releases must be available to demonstrate 
compliance with the limits of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I . 
2. Prediction of Accident-Caused Releases: Estimates of public exposure resulting from 
accidents will be based on models from at least three other disciplines. 
i. Reactor thermal–physical models, describing the temperatures, flows, and structural 
conditions following the event driver.  In the case of Generation IV reactors such as 
NGNP, a major design objective is to employ passive safety features that limit 
reactor responses in all plausible accident scenarios such that no significant fuel 
failure and FP releases occur.  This needs to be considered as a mitigating factor in 
assessing potential FPT and releases outside the confinement area. 
ii. Fuel behavior models, describing the effect of the accident conditions on the physical 
and chemical integrity of the fuel. 
iii. FPT models, describing the rate of movement of FPs from their normal location in 
the fuel particle and from their distributed normal operation locations in the reactor 
circuit to and through the reactor pressure boundary breech and confinement.  This 
topic includes both design-basis and beyond-design-basis accidents.  Past HTGR 
practice has been to apply the lower Protective Action Guidelines (PAG) limits to the 
Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) rather than the 10 CFR Part 100 specifications to 
eliminate the need for emergency planning beyond the EAB.  This approach limits 
the whole body dose to 1 Rem (R) and the thyroid dose to 5 R for accident 
frequencies as low as 10-6 per reactor-year.  However, this logic should be reviewed 
in light of the regulatory document revisions that have taken place since the early 
1990s.  
3. Prediction of Maintenance Doses:  To plan for worker safety and plant maintenance 
operations, a reasonable estimate of the reactor system contamination levels is required.  
This estimate will also affect the waste disposal and reactor maintenance strategies. 
All three applications require a prediction of the FP distribution within the reactor system as a 
starting point as well as the stability and mobility of this initial distribution.  They also require a 
prediction of the fuel failure rate. 
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5.1 FISSION PRODUCT AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS TRANSPORT 
PHENOMENA 
The principal phenomena of HTGR FPT and radioactive materials transport include 
• FP retention in or transport out of the fuel kernel of a coated particle, 
• FPT through particle coatings, 
• FPT through or sorption in fuel matrix and fuel block graphite, 
• FPT around primary circuit and sorption of reactor system alloys, 
• removal of deposited FPs from primary circuit alloys, 
• transport mechanisms of tritium, 
• transport mechanisms of heavy metals, and 
• FP and radioactive materials transport into and through the reactor cavity. 
5.2 EXPERIMENTAL AND ANALYTICAL MODELING ASPECTS OF PHENOMENA 
5.2.1 Background and History of FPT Model Development 
A wealth of data and transport models for the gas-cooled reactor community has been collected 
and developed over the decades, and this information inspires confidence that the NGNP concept will 
have benign accident behavior and very low if any releases from AOOs or design basis accidents 
(DBA).  However, while the data show that it is possible to design a reactor with excellent accident 
mitigation features, barring unlimited air ingress, it has not been adequately shown that the planned 
designs will always have releases small enough to preclude significant effluent filtering or 
containment during a rapid depressurization event.  To avoid constructing a high-pressure reactor 
building, the designers have proposed venting the initial pressure release without filtering on the 
grounds that the FP content of the gases exiting the reactor building is very low.  Once the 
depressurization has been completed, FP containment becomes less difficult because both the reactor 
and reactor building are at approximately atmospheric pressure and the main driving force, the high-
pressure helium, is now absent.  A bank of low-flow filters can then handle the modest flow demands 
and the expected small FP releases from the reactor system.  Water or air ingress into the reactor can 
also occur and complicate the situation, but the lack of a strong pressure difference to drive FPs out of 
the reactor or reactor building is advantageous. 
For this design approach to proceed, one must show that the FPs available for release and their 
transport path result in only very small releases under the possible accident conditions.  Thus, the 
designers must show that the source term, the transport mechanisms, and the accident configurations 
are well understood, are supported by data and testing, and that sufficient margin is available to 
encompass uncertainties. 
Currently, designers and regulators are assessing the gaps in the knowledge base along with the 
proposed designs so that resources can be assigned appropriately.  At present, the major areas of 
concern for a fuel and FP transport gap analysis are 
• physical models and the supporting mathematical methods, 
• relevant data on materials or components over the range of interest and data uncertainties 
(single effects testing), 
• reactor component and confinement/containment configuration and their relative roles in 
the safety case, 
• computational software or other methods for determining the quantitative results, and 
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• integral testing over a wide range of conditions to support the development of 
computational methods and the quantification of the data and associated uncertainties. 
In the past, the DOE-funded HTGR program has approached this need by producing a set of 
design data needs (DDNs) and a V&V plan that identified data issues that needed to be resolved to 
minimize design risk (Appendix A in Ref. 5-1 is an example of the DDN approach; Ref. 5-2 is a 
somewhat dated but informative V&V plan; Ref. 5-3 is brief, generic, and not very specific).  For the 
most part, little progress was made on these DDNs and V&V plans over the years; they do, however, 
serve as starting point for a gap analysis since they reflect past thinking on the needs and problems.  
A more recent approach is outlined in Ref. 5-4, and Ref. 5-5 outlines the top-down approach toward 
safety. 
The major emphasis has been on data; there was less emphasis on the development of physical 
models probably because the lack of data for even the simple models made work on the more 
sophisticated models of limited benefit, and the simpler models appeared to be adequate for the needs 
of the time.  In principle, a large and robust database would encourage the comparison of different 
models, but the lack of data and the difficulty of collecting the relevant data forces one toward models 
with sparse data needs.  This often pushes designers toward models that produce conservative results 
rather than models that accurately follow the physics [5-6].  Such models become less useful outside 
of their narrow empirical boundaries. 
A past approach has been to specify that a representation (fission metal transport in graphite, for 
example) should model the data from an experiment (and a series of experiments) within a factor of 
10 to a certainty of 95%.  It is not clear whether this approach will be acceptable in the current 
environment because the demand for model fidelity may be higher and it may not fit within the 
accuracy needs of the NGNP; again, a design and safety philosophy is required.  For example, to 
inspire confidence in the basic physical understanding, the regulators may require that the model 
follow the data trends (increases and decreases as a function of key parameters) rather than just be 
within a factor of 10 of the actual answer [e.g., over the range of x, the constant value 4.0 is easily 
within a factor of 10 of the function 2.0 + cos(x), and is a conservative limit, but completely lacks the 
oscillatory information, leaving one to wonder if the underlying physics is correct].   
Another issue is the compounding of uncertainties.  If a six-step transport process has a factor of 
10 in uncertainty at each step, the final answer could have a final uncertainty of six orders of 
magnitude.  While such a large uncertainty may not be likely, it serves to show that a multistep 
transport process can compound uncertainties, and the overall path must be considered when 
evaluating individual models.  Because of the desire to use some variation of a vented confinement, a 
designer cannot simply use bounding assumptions; significant credit must be taken for FP holdup in 
the reactor system.  This drives the need for a creditable transport model. 
Transport equations tend to encompass some difficult physics and mathematics, and these 
equations must be coupled with the varying thermo hydraulics of the core to allow a realistic solution 
[5-7].  Between data needs, mathematics, and software development, a rather difficult and expensive 
program is generated.  Final verification of the software and models may require an in-pile loop, a 
difficult and expensive test with many practical limitations.  Thus, there are obstacles to developing 
an accurate, practical transport computational package that allows one to take full advantage of the FP 
retaining capability of the reactor system components.  In addition, an accident can introduce 
mechanical effects such as shocks, vibrations, acoustical noise, and component fragmentation, which 
may add uncertainties to the prediction of dispersion forces.  The shocks and vibrations are of 
particular relevance in the NGNP case because a significant portion of the FPs available for release 
may be either contained in a thin dust layer on the component surfaces or in a friable surface film.  
Re-entrainment of this dust in the existing gas stream and fracturings of the surface film are transport 
mechanisms that need to be considered if the coolant is to be released directly to the environment. 
  34
In the case of the NGNP, economics limits the FPT attenuation strategy [5-8, 5-9].  A 
confinement capable of extensive filtering of a depressurization accident would require a robust 
building and very large efficient filters which would probably have severe cost consequences.  
Likewise, containment with an accompanying vent-filter would be a large expensive structure [5-10 
through 5-12].  Thus, there is a need to first reduce the core-material FP load by pushing fuel 
performance to its limit and, second, a need to show that the FPs largely remain in the reactor system.  
If possible, these two factors will greatly limit the FPs entering the reactor building and, if favorable 
enough, will require the building to play only a minor role in the attenuation of FPs prior to a (direct) 
release of the core helium to the environment.  In the past, DOE had developed a strategy for FP 
release and the role played by each component; the high cost of an efficient confinement or 
containment and the upper limit on fuel quality pushes one toward taking substantial credit for FP 
holdup in the core and reactor internals.  This is the genesis of the FPT program - a replacement of 
expensive physical structures with extensive (favorable) knowledge about the FP behavior and 
transport under all conditions of interest.  
Complex models with great needs for data and testing are not required if the designer can show 
that the simpler models bound the physical value for all conditions of interest, but this requires more 
than just inserting an arbitrary factor to cover the gap.  It requires some analysis showing that the 
physical solution is bounded by the approximation methods chosen; this is difficult in the case of the 
NGNP because one does not want to resort to a bounding-type analysis, and transport mechanisms 
cannot be easily compressed into a simple form from which a release envelope can be obtained.  One 
approach may be to frame the problem in a finite time interval.  Since the transport processes 
(diffusion, sorption) are generally slow functions of time and the accident has a finite duration, it may 
be possible to bound the releases by time intervals.  This approach may be more useable than an 
inventory bounding approach.  However, it would not help in the case of dust release or component 
fragmentation, both of which occur on a rapid timescale. 
Maintenance issues also drive the need to minimize and understand FPT in the primary circuit.  A 
low contamination circuit will greatly aid in the maintenance of the reactor circuit and any power 
conversion components.  The ability to predict and control the contamination of the reactor circuit can 
result in significant cost savings, due to reduced needs for shielding and the ability to conduct hands-
on work. 
5.2.2 Physical Models of Phenomena and Supporting Analytical Methods 
The required functions of any suite of transport models would include the following (see Refs. 
5-6 and 5-13 and also see the FPT section in the PIRT main report, Ref. 1-1). 
• The nuclides of interest: For diffusive, adsorptive, or vaporization movement, the 
following elements are important: iodine (I), krypton (Kr), xenon (Xe), cesium (Cs), 
strontium (Sr), tellurium (Te), and silver (Ag).  Also of great importance is the chemical 
form of these elements in the reactor circuit.  In addition, graphite and coolant impurities 
may be of interest as they may react with the above elements to produce volatile 
compounds.   
• FP release from the fuel:  The failed fuel fraction and any diffusion from intact fuel 
provide a starting point for the transport analysis.  This release is very important because 
it is effectively the starting point for the transport process and forms the bulk of the 
material available for release, since fuel failure during accidents is expected to be very 
low. 
• Diffusion, adsorption, and desorption in graphite and fuel matrix materials: After release 
from the fuel, these are the first materials encountered by the FPs.  Sensitivities to 
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specific graphite type, neutron fluence, and chemical environment as well as temperature 
are required.  Fuel forms, reflectors, and dust are impacted. 
• Adsorption, desorption, and in-diffusion in reactor system metals:  FPs plate out on 
metallic components, and the chemical state of the FP, the surface states, and the 
temperatures of the component all affect the deposition of material.  Radionuclides may 
be trapped by in-diffusion.  Power system components such as heat exchangers may be 
sinks. 
• Chemical and physical forms of the FPs in the coolant:  FPs may exist in the coolant as 
elements, compounds, aerosols, or may be attached to dust.  The amount removed per 
pass of the coolant through the reactor system influences the distribution of FPs and the 
coolant inventory.  Mobile components may exist in an equilibrium that depends on the 
coolant flow rate. 
• Tritium transport models:  Tritium is one of the expected isotopes to be released on an 
annual basis since it permeates through metals at high temperatures. 
• Aerosols and dusts that plate-out on reactor system components and their mobility:  
Mobile and unstable deposits can be re-entrained by changes in the coolant flow rate, by 
vibration, and by mechanical shocks.  These deposits are vulnerable to release by a break 
in the reactor pressure boundary.  If they contain significant activity, they will require 
holdup by the reactor building (or filters). 
• FP reactions with the confinement building materials:  Chemical reactions can convert 
elemental forms of FPs to compounds that are more volatile and biologically active.  
Iodine is important in this regard. 
• Reactions of the reactor system components and FPs with air or steam:  Oxidizers 
change the oxygen potential of the reactor system as well as attack the reactor 
components.  Increased releases can come from both FP chemical reactions as well as the 
release of FPs embedded in eroded components.  
• Plume models that transport the released material beyond the reactor building:  Once 
outside the reactor building, the usual plume models are expected to apply with the 
understanding that the particle sizes, building humidity (dry helium), and compounds 
may be different from those of the LWR experience. 
The simplest models for use in reactor FPT analysis may consist of vapor transport models based 
on sorptive isotherms, combined with simple Fickian diffusion for the bulk material, and simple 
aerosol transport models for dust.  Depending on the safety role played by the confinement or 
containment, this could be sufficient.  However, since transport theory encompasses a wide variety of 
mechanisms that are sensitive to surface conditions and variations in bulk material properties, a 
simple model may not be sufficient, especially since accidents may lead to significant changes in 
material properties due to chemical reactions (coolant impurities, air, and steam). 
A direct approach using the Maxwell-Stefan equations and chemical reactions may not be 
practical due to both the complexity of the mathematics and the large amount of data required.  In 
addition, a large pipe break will result in major mechanical forces that can spall off material or 
damage and fragment brittle components, adding a mechanical component to the analysis. 
The mechanical, vibrational, and acoustical forces associated with a large pipe break do not seem 
to be included in the forces that may generate or re-entrain particles in the exiting gas stream in many 
of the current literature models, even though the NUREG-0800 guidance specifically lists pipe whip 
issues as important.  Past testing of gas-cooled reactor components has shown that flow vibrations 
due to normal operation can be important and can even damage components [Ref. 5-14 details some 
flow induced problems in the British Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR)].  A sudden pipe break can 
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change the flow path and flow rates as well as introduce a shock to the reactor system.  This off-
normal flow situation should be analyzed to determine if the shocks and new flow-induced forces are 
strong enough to damage or fragment components, and if any vibrations will contribute to the 
generation and re-entrainment of particles or aerosols into the reactor coolant. 
At this early stage in the NGNP development, it is unclear what level of modeling fidelity is 
required for the reactor circuit, and the regulators cannot evaluate the situation until a conceptual 
design is available and the safety functions of the reactor system, confinement or containment 
building, and any filters, are outlined.  Also of interest is any mitigation feature that would allow a 
meaningful response to an unexpected situation either due to an accident or due to problems that turn 
up during or after construction.  One concern with intrinsic safety is that it may not be possible to 
retrofit or reconfigure the reactor or reactor building should an unexpected problem arise after 
construction.  Long-term experience with LWRs revealed numerous problems that required 
modifications after construction had begun or was complete. 
The following steps would be required to determine the level of physical modeling needed from 
the NGNP. 
• Determine the safety function of each subsystem and the level of FPT attenuation 
required.  Very high levels of FP retention and attenuation under extreme conditions will 
require a high level of modeling, data collection, and testing; low-to-modest levels of 
FPT attenuation will allow the use of a coarser approximation and simpler bounding-type 
testing rather than highly quantitative analysis.  The relative costs of safety design 
options may push the major responsibility for FPT attenuation onto well-understood 
components, thus avoiding an expensive development effort for the less-well-understood, 
difficult-to-test components. 
• Determine the level of sensitivity to the component uncertainties and how this reflects on 
the physical models.  Highly sensitive models coupled with relatively high data 
uncertainty may not be very useful. 
• Estimate the difficulty in obtaining the data and conducting the testing to support the 
safety case. 
• Scope out how V&V can be performed. 
The conceptual reactor designs presented in the recent PIRT exercises [1-1] allowed direct 
venting to the environment for a rapid coolant release due to a major pipe break.  After a few minutes 
the vents would close, and some sort of filters (building filters and/or the normal HVAC filters) 
would be in the circuit to handle the later releases.  The building may or may not be of low-leakage 
design.  For analysis and component design purposes, the most challenging design is a higher-
leakage, vented building design that relies heavily on the fuel and reactor internal components for FP 
retention, and only a modest amount of building FPT attenuation.  This option could require a rather 
large effort to collect the data and develop the models for analysis. 
5.2.3 Brief Summary of Phenomena Models 
Examples of physical models and brief descriptions of codes are available in Refs. 5-2, 5-6, 5-13, 
5-15, and 5-16; also, see the FPT Section of the summary PIRT report [1-1] and the TRISO fuel PIRT 
report [5-17].  Note that much of the literature is dated material, and currently work is under way to 
cull and update these codes and models.  In addition, there is a wealth of up-to-date computational 
tools from the fluid flow, LWR, chemical, and diffusion physics communities.  Thus, the actual 
modeling case is probably better and more advanced than indicated by the current and past gas-cooled 
reactor literature, with the exception of specific materials data and models focused on plate-out.   
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The first major issue will be to capture all the relevant physics, coupled with the core thermo-
hydraulics, to produce an integrated model.  The second issue will be to collect all the data to support 
the integrated code suite.  The final issue will be to determine and conduct the necessary testing to 
support the particular NGNP design.  These last two issues are likely to be the most difficult, and the 
ability to conduct them within time and cost constraints may force design, modeling, and data 
collection compromises. 
Several attempts to model experiments have been conducted with generally favorable results, but 
anomalies are apparent and uncertainties are very high (much greater than a factor of 10) [5-6, 5-13, 
5-16].  These anomalies may be due to difficulties in modeling the actual configuration, incomplete 
data, or effects not in the models, such as surface films, aerosols, or dust transport.  
The following sections briefly summarize the state of the models as presented in the review 
literature [5-6, 5-13, 5-16, 5-17].  This should be considered an introduction with the caveat that 
proprietary models and data may be available to supplement or supersede this material.  The reader 
may notice that the major issue is the lack of a robust database for the materials of interest.  Much 
work has been done in the past, but the variability of the materials, the design changes, and the 
difficulty of adequately characterizing the materials makes extrapolating past data and results suspect, 
thus the need for more testing. 
A host of models exists, both based on empirical data fits and transport theory; the complex 
environment and the difficulty of collecting data have forced modelers into using simpler models and 
expressions than one might expect.  Often, the database needed to sort out the physics and critically 
evaluate models does not appear to exist. 
5.2.3.1 Coated-particle fuel performance models 
Currently fuel performance models are in a state of development.  Past models often relied on 
particle coating “pressure vessel” failure models, which now appear to be too simplistic, although 
they may be suitable for some specific fuels under well-characterized conditions [5-6, 5-17].  The 
German code CONVOL predicts very low failure fractions for the German fuel, and the irradiations 
have seen these low failure fractions; the code and the irradiation did not disagree, but it is not clear if 
this corresponds to a validation of the code.  Post-irradiation examination of particle fuel is difficult 
because of the large number of particles and the limited ability to locate a flaw within a particle.  
Conducting an irradiation program to fully examine the fuel envelope and compare the results to the 
models would be very expensive and time-consuming.   
Past U.S. models [the General Atomics (GA) code PISA, for example] were based on a one-
dimensional multilayer stress analysis that did not appear to be adequate for past U.S. fuel under its 
irradiation conditions.  Current models are based on a detailed stress analysis of the particle coating 
layers and the interfaces between them.  Failures are now seen to be due as much to local stresses 
stemming from coating interfaces or cracks due to global over-pressurization.  These models are 
currently under development, as are the irradiations they hope to predict.  Two of the recent codes are 
PARFUME and TIMCOAT [5-18, 5-19].  Both codes have been used to explain the differences 
between the past German and U.S. fuel performance. 
Codes predicting fuel performance at high (accident) temperatures, such as PANAMA (and the 
later modifications), were successfully used by the German program to model the high-temperature 
behavior of their fuel.  This type of approach may be useful for NGNP if a similar fuel type is used 
and the normal operating conditions and burnups are not much more aggressive.  High temperatures 
and higher burnups can lead to much greater noble metal corrosion of the SiC layer, which can result 
in a higher failure rate at accident temperatures.  The new U.S. fuel prediction codes are expected to 
include the ability to model accidents, so this work may already be under way. 
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A major factor limiting the predictive ability of the suite of fuel performance models is simply the 
lack of sufficient materials property data for the particular fuel and a robust database.  A host of 
structural, diffusion, and chemical kinetics data is required to do the calculations.  Since the current 
fuel is specified by process conditions as well as measurable properties, the best way to fill these gaps 
is not immediately known; one cannot easily appeal to theory.  The literature values may or may not 
apply to a particular fuel.  At this point, the data uncertainties are probably large.  Extensive testing of 
the actual fuel to be used, followed by backing out the coefficients after testing, may be the only 
practical approach. 
Exactly what is meant by comparing code predictions to experiment needs to be clarified.  If the 
coatings parameters are found by comparing the code results to irradiations rather than by 
independent measurement of the properties as a function of neutron fluence and temperature (which 
could be a nearly impossible task), the problem then arises in deciding whether the values computed 
are actual physical values or simply a set of parameters that make the code work for available data 
sets.  A likely approach is to combine information from several sources: historical, specific 
measurements, theory, and experimental back-out and then check for consistency.  
Once a failed fuel fraction has been computed, another issue pertinent to transport is the behavior 
of the PyC and SiC layers because they form the barrier to FP release, assuming the rest of the 
particle is well behaved.  Diffusion models are used in these layers, but silver appears to move by 
another mechanism.  Diffusion coefficients for SiC (and PyC) have been measured for several 
isotopes at the temperatures of interest, but they depend on the microstructure of the material.  So far, 
this dependence on microstructure has not been quantified and is a topic of current interest.  Other 
issues include FP corrosion of the SiC layer, migration of the kernel, and high-temperature 
decomposition of the SiC.  All these issues have uncertainty associated with them, but they are 
controllable by regulating the oxygen potential of the kernel, controlling the normal operating 
temperature, and limiting the accident temperature.  Chemical attack of the fuel under oxidizing 
conditions is also likely.  Again, we are back to a database. 
The importance of these models lies in the quantification of the source term to be used for both 
normal operation and accident conditions.  A large uncertainty in the source term will propagate 
through the entire transport chain, so a credible estimate will be necessary to justify the selection of 
the containment/confinement option. 
5.2.3.2 Fuel-form mechanical and thermal models 
The mechanical, thermal, and chemical properties of the fuel form (sphere or compact) influence 
its behavior during normal behavior and under accident conditions.  The dimensional change of a fuel 
compact vs the dimensional change of its hole in the graphite block influences the mechanical stresses 
on the compact (crushing) and heat transfer (across a gap).  Thermal behavior determines temperature 
drops, and chemical properties determine the behavior under chemical attack conditions (even at 
normal operating conditions, because of impurity attack). 
Models have been developed for past fuel forms with their particular matrix mixes, heat 
treatment, and final density.  For the most part, the dimensional and thermal models are polynomial 
fits to the data rather than theoretically based.  It is not clear that this information will apply to fuel 
forms with different matrix formulations and densities and exposed to conditions beyond tested 
boundaries.  Chemical activity will probably also be a function of the particular matrix and heat 
treatment.  These properties are likely to be a function of neutron fluence as well.  
Unless the current fuel will duplicate past, well-characterized fuel, a data gap is likely, and testing 
will be necessary to obtain coefficients necessary for the models and to determine the particle damage 
fraction during fabrication.  Chemical activity may be a function of impurities and specific 
processing.  The models will then have to be updated or modified.   
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A longer term issue is the availability of the specific materials used to make the matrix.  The 
matrix is a combination of synthetic and natural graphites along with a binder.  Since the 
characteristics of the materials depend on the feedstocks, which can be variable, one would like 
assurances that significant matrix property changes will not occur over the long term.  One option is 
continuous testing of the matrix and fuel forms, but this can cause schedule delays and additional 
expense.  Other solutions to this problem would be desirable. 
5.2.3.3 FPT within the kernel 
FPT within the kernel is the first step in the release of FPs.  It is most important for crushed or 
failed fuel particles, because these releases go directly into the fuel matrix.  These releases, combined 
with any uranium contamination, dominate the activity in the reactor circuit during normal operation; 
at higher temperature accident conditions, their release rate may increase. 
The Booth model is generally the starting point for FPT from the kernel.  Different models 
include variations due to the birth point of a FP (grain or pore), recoils (athermal diffusion), trapping, 
and vacancy migration diffusion.  Temperature effects are included as well.  The models often include 
several constants that must be determined by experiments, as well as process parameters such as grain 
size.  Coefficients for the various models have been tabulated for a range of past experiments.  
However, the results may be sensitive to the exact processing used for the particular fuel (density, 
pores, grains, chemistry), so verification of a particular model may be necessary for the NGNP fuel.  
This is indicative of the VHTGR dilemma and will be seen throughout this section; a host of models 
and data exist, but the variability of materials and process methods, along with the sensitivity of the 
physical process to the actual configuration, are obstacles in settling the issue once and for all. 
Since a host of kernel (fuel) FP release models are available, both from the VHTGR and LWR 
communities, the major issue will be to observe the releases for the specific fuel kernel, see what 
model best describes them, and compute the required coefficients or determine if the literature 
coefficients are acceptable.  A fallback position would be to make kernels using a well-characterized 
process or use known highly conservative release values. 
During normal operation, the release rate is significantly less than 100% and an accurate 
estimation of the released material will probably result in a lower modeled coolant activity and 
primary circuit contamination than if one uses a bounding estimate (100% release).  This could have a 
large effect on the modeled release during a depressurization accident, with the resulting regulatory 
impact and the need for a means of mitigation. 
Generally, FP release is broken into two components, inert gases and metallic elements.  Iodine 
and tellurium are assumed to behave like xenon.  The uncertainty in the U.S. modeling gas releases is 
estimated to be roughly a factor of two with the caveat that much of this model was developed in a 
TRIGA reactor environment, which may or may not be appropriate for the NGNP.  The situation for 
the metallic elements is not as good with the uncertainty simply listed as “exceeding large” [5-6].  
Other international models focused on a particular kernel at the conditions of interest and may be 
better, provided the NGNP uses a kernel with similar properties under similar conditions [5-13].  The 
kernel design has not yet been selected.  
Because much depends on the kernel grain structure and oxygen potential, the releases can 
change with burnup.  Also, air or water can oxidize the kernel and greatly increase releases.  Some 
data are available for kernel oxidation, and it depends on a host of conditions such as kernel 
composition, temperature, and burnup. 
If specific information is available for a known fuel type, and water ingress is not a concern, the 
current modeling and data situation may be more tractable for estimating the releases during normal 
operation; otherwise, such data will have to be collected or at least a specific database confirmed.  If 
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no data are available, 100% release from the kernel may have to be assumed for regulatory purposes, 
with possible design penalties. 
5.2.3.4 FPT in graphite and matrix material 
Once released from the fuel, the fission gases are assumed to very quickly move through the 
matrix material and graphite to the coolant; thus, the release model is an instantaneous transfer to the 
coolant.  Metallic FPs are assumed to fairly quickly (instantaneously in the case of fuel compacts) 
distribute themselves throughout the matrix material.  Overall, the matrix is assumed to have little 
impedance to gas transfer and to have a very high diffusion coefficient for metallic elements 
(compared to graphite).  Graphite is also assumed to have no impedance to gas transport. 
Note that the matrix material planned for use in the NGNP will be much more like the matrix 
material used in pebbles rather than that used in historical U.S. compacts, even if the prismatic core 
option is used.  The transport characteristics are more likely to be like those of the German pebbles or 
the Japanese compacts.  
Graphite has significant impedance for the transport of the metallic FPs.  Older models have used 
simple Fickian diffusion, which is believed to be an oversimplification; the actual mechanisms are 
believed to include both trapping and diffusion, and new models may include these effects.  However, 
the actual model to use is not clear at this time, and simple diffusion with an effective diffusion 
coefficient may be good enough in some cases.   
Transport in graphite is dependent on the type of graphite, the neutron fluence, oxidation state of 
the graphite, source concentrations, and impurities which may act as trapping sites.  Since the NGNP 
is likely to use a graphite that differs somewhat from the historical materials, it is very likely that the 
use of past literature data for other graphite types will introduce great uncertainty into these 
calculations.  Testing of the actual graphite will be necessary to get realistic transport coefficients.  
While much past gas-cooled reactor modeling used Fickian diffusion, it should not be too difficult to 
explore the newer, more advanced codes for application to this problem.  The downside is that the 
codes will require more data if one is to include effects beyond simple diffusion such as permeation, 
trapping, fluence effects, and chemical reactions with impurities.  Again, the program is data limited 
and the data are difficult to acquire.  It might be interesting to see if a theoretical release envelope 
could be determined that would be more conservative than detailed (but difficult) calculations and 
smaller than a bounding (but large) estimate.  
As with the matrix, a long-term concern is the stability of the graphite supply.  Graphites are 
sensitive to the coke source and the processing conditions, so if the safety case for the reactor depends 
strongly on the graphite transport properties, long-term monitoring of graphite transport properties 
may be a consideration if coke sources and processing conditions are changeable. 
5.2.3.5 Fission product sorption in matrix and graphite 
Sorption isotherms used in the models and codes are a combination of the Freundlich and Henrian 
isotherms.  Data has been obtained for some elements; others may be assumed to be similar to their 
chemical cousins.  Matrix material does not appear to be affected by neutron fluence, but oxidation 
effects are not clear.  As usual, the model coefficients could be affected by the particular matrix mix 
used in the fuel form, so uncertainties may be high if the actual matrix to be used has not been 
explored. 
Unlike matrix material, sorptivity in graphite is a function of neutron fluence, generally 
increasing.  The existing database is incomplete, and some of it is for unirradiated graphite.  Again, 
chemical cousins are often assumed to have similar behavior; this may or may not be acceptable for 
regulatory purposes.  Also, the NGNP graphite may be different from historical materials. 
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Two other issues may be important for these models.  The first is the approach to equilibrium and 
whether this relaxation time is important for general calculations or accident conditions, and the 
second is the FP reactions with graphite impurities.  If the approach to equilibrium is reasonably 
rapid, an assumption of equilibrium conditions may be acceptable since the NGNP is expected to 
have slow accident behavior.  The reaction with impurities is more problematic.  Iodine may react 
with metallic graphite impurities to form volatile metallic iodides, decreasing the ability of graphite to 
hold iodine.  Some preliminary data indicate an effect of orders of magnitude [5-6].  If chemical 
issues are important, the situation becomes quite complex as one then needs the behavior for a wide 
range of elements and compounds along with their equilibrium. 
The sorptive isotherms are key to modeling the transport across the fuel compact graphite gap and 
the release from either fuel form into the coolant.  Partition coefficients between fuel compacts and 
graphite blocks can be determined and used to relate compact surface concentrations with 
neighboring graphite surface concentrations, but they too are sensitive to the isotherms.   
Modeling the release into the coolant is determined by a mass transport equation that relates the 
mass flux into the coolant to the concentration gradient across the boundary layer and the FP 
desorption at the graphite block or pebble surface. Simulations of experiments have often seen an 
under-prediction of cesium transport, and other effects such as kinetics or boundary layer behavior 
may come into play.  Some of these effects may be in the codes.  The modeling is not straightforward 
because of these multiple effects, each of which carries an uncertainty into the transport path. 
The transport of FPs from the surface of the fuel form to the coolant is a particularly important 
issue as once the FPs are in the coolant they can be spread throughout the reactor system and move 
back and forth between other transport intermediaries such as dust and mechanically unstable surface 
films.  It is this mobile and friable material that is subject to release during a depressurization.  If the 
sorption transport rate is low, it will be a welcomed bottleneck in the transport path; if high, increased 
emphasis will need to be placed on determining the releases into the matrix and graphite material 
from the fuel particles. 
5.2.3.6 Transport of fission products and sorption on reactor system metals 
A considerable amount of work has been done in the code area, with the FRESCO and SPTRAN 
codes for the German program, the FORNAX code for the Japanese program, COPAR, PADLOC, 
TRAMP, and TRAFIC for the U.S. program, and RADAX for the South African program.  Others 
codes are likely to be under development as well.  As a rule, these codes include diffusion transport, 
sorption, and in some cases, dust to compute the FP distribution in the reactor circuit.  The reader will 
have to refer to the latest documentation (from the code writing institution) for a particular code to 
understand the details, as the open literature may be a decade or more behind. 
It is difficult to rate the V&V status of these codes and how they might be applied to the NGNP 
because a particular code may not include all the possible transport mechanisms active in the core.  In 
addition, the lack of specific data and realistic integral experiments limits the application to the 
NGNP.  The actual design of the NGNP may or may not impact the dominant transport mechanisms 
in the codes; any mitigation means could allow more uncertainty in the transport calculations.  If great 
dependence for the safety case is made on the transport calculations, extensive testing and code work 
may be required. 
One of the major issues is dust and aerosol transport under both normal and accident conditions.  
Recent models and experiments may shed some light on this issue.  The importance of this issue for 
the NGNP is unknown at present but is likely to be high if reactor circuit retention of FPs is very 
important to the safety case. 
Overall, a framework for the computations, a model subset, and a modest database are available 
for the transport calculations relevant to the NGNP, both from the VHTGR community and the 
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general transport community.  Exactly how to apply this information to the unspecified NGNP design 
is unclear at present, but it is likely that some effort will be required to select the most appropriate 
models and collect the necessary data.  Pertinent to this task is to determine the uncertainty of the 
calculations, as the demands of more than modest uncertainty (~10–100 times) could be very high. 
Sorption is used in the models to predict mass transfer across the gas/solid boundary, and whether 
or not this model is appropriate to the NGNP situation is unclear.  Other forms of transport, such as 
dust or aerosol transport or increased volatility due to chemical reactions, might also be included.  
The full spectrum of mechanisms to be considered is not clear at the present time.  Deposition on 
metal surfaces is modeled as sorption behavior either alone or accompanied by dust. Modeling 
indicates a virtually 100% deposition of FP metals per circuit pass, but dust or aerosol transport may 
be important in actual reactors, leading to a small but significant circulation of FPs in the primary 
loop.  The presence of dust has been shown to modify the deposition profile and could result in fewer 
FPs in the cooler section of the reactor circuit at the expense of a mobile form of contamination. 
Some metals may diffuse into the metals, aiding in the immobilization of FPs; however, the lack 
of relevant sorption and diffusion data leads to great uncertainties in evaluating plate-out behavior 
and its mobility.  This represents another data gap, but a modeling gap may also exist if sorption 
behavior models are not adequate.  There is very little information for turbine-type alloys and the true 
importance of the dust or aerosol issue.  This problem is particularly acute for silver transport and 
maintenance of the power conversion system [5-16].  
5.2.3.7 Removal of deposited fission products from primary circuit alloys 
Depressurization accidents can blow contaminated mobile material out of the primary circuit and 
into the reactor building.  The historical models generally use some variation of the coolant shear 
stress near the wall to remove and entrain material in the existing coolant.  As discussed in the FPT 
Section of the summary PIRT report [1-1], this is unlikely to be an acceptable model by itself because 
it does not include the mechanical shocks, vibration, or acoustical noise that would be generated by 
the structural failure of a large high-pressure pipe.  Past experiments were condemned as flawed 
because lift-off tests were conducted by cutting and removing sections of pipe and transferring them 
to a different apparatus for lift-off evaluation.  Such tests showed much larger lift-off fractions than 
tests that were conducted in situ [5-6].  The fact that mechanical handling would damage friable 
surface films and dust bonds seems to have been no part of the discussion, but this is exactly what one 
would expect with a failure of this nature. Other testing included physically wiping the components 
with a cloth and saw higher removal rates than by shear ratio changes alone [5-13].  The scatter in the 
test data is large. 
Other FP surface removal effects such as steam and air have been examined to some extent, but 
the data and testing are sparse.  Overall, this should be re-examined in light of the specific needs of 
the NGNP and the neglect of mechanical actions.  In particular, the mechanical effects on surface 
films and component fragmentation should be investigated, as well as the flow induced vibration 
effects that may cause further particle re-entrainment or reactor system damage.  A massive high-
pressure pipe failure can potentially cause serious secondary damage. 
The potential uncertainties in this area could lead to design compromises if the FP contamination 
of the reactor circuit is significant.  The issues of surface film or deposit spalling and collateral 
damage need to be addressed more directly. 
5.2.3.8 Dust and aerosol transport 
Past modeling has indicated that circuit contamination in low-temperature regions is significantly 
reduced through the presence of dust.  This is due to a partial decontamination of the surface by dust 
desorption and by the binding of FPs to the dust in the gas phase.  The final FP distribution can then 
become complex because of the dust transport, which depends on dust particle size and nature as well 
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as on the coolant flow rate and flow rate variations.  This is a complex problem because of the 
competition between the dust and the structural metals for the FPs; mass transport and sorption 
models will have to include this effect.  Absorption of FPs on dust will then make them more mobile 
in the case of a pressure boundary breech. 
There has been considerable progress in dust and aerosol models in the past decade, and these 
models rather than the historical gas-cooled reactor models may be better starting points [5-20, 5-21].  
This area should be re-examined in light of the recent work in this field and the experiments done for 
LWRs.  New models and insights have been developed over the past decade, and this material is not 
considered in the older VHTGR codes.  Since FPs entrained in the exiting helium are so important for 
release calculations, careful analysis is warranted.  A way to conduct bounding calculations would be 
welcome as this modeling tends to be complex. 
Dust generation by abrasion, metal oxidation, oil soot, fast neutron damage, and carbon filament 
growth will need to be addressed as well to determine the quantity of dust in the circuit.  Some kind 
of model will be necessary to estimate the generation rate and the size of particles.  Aerosols may be 
of interest as well.  This is also a difficult area, and the available models may not be sufficient if 
accurate dust and aerosol measures are required.  Estimates of 10 mg per pebble per pass through the 
core for dust generation lead to many hundreds of kilograms of dust in a pebble-fueled power reactor.  
Where the material ends up and how it is recycled within the flow circuit is important for conducting 
transport calculations.   
This entire area is another important concern.  If a substantial portion of the FP inventory ends up 
on mobile components such as dust and oxide particles, the vented containment option may require 
considerable analysis to evaluate its suitability.  Lack of a good predictive ability may lead to large 
uncertainties which could drive the designers away from the vented confinement option and to some 
kind of effluent filtering. 
5.2.3.9 Tritium transport 
Tritium is usually more mobile and exhibits different behavior from FPs.  It can diffuse through 
metals at high temperatures and thus becomes part of the normal releases of an operating reactor.  SiC 
retains tritium well, so most of the tritium generated in the fuel comes from fuel with absent or 
damaged SiC.  PyC can also retain tritium, although not to the extent of SiC.  Graphite impurities, 
B4C control rods, and 3He impurities generate small amounts of tritium as well. 
Tritium release from kernels is often assumed to be 100% and that from control rods is assumed 
to be due to diffusive release.  It is assumed to have rapid transport through the matrix and have no 
sorption in graphite at temperatures less than 650ºC, temperature-dependent sorption between 650ºC 
and 1223ºC, and desorption above 1223ºC.  Sorption is modeled as increasing with neutron fluence.  
The data for this model are weak, and more recent work from the fusion area might be used to fill in 
data and model gaps. 
The transport of tritium though metals depends on the alloy, the surface film, the temperature, and 
coolant concentration.  Historical models were developed for steam generator materials, and these 
may not be appropriate for current alloys.  These models are dated, and the literature should be 
reviewed for newer models and materials data. 
The tritium generation is not expected to be large, so greater uncertainty may be acceptable in the 
modeling.  It is likely that suitable models and data can be found in the recent literature, so tritium is 
not likely to be a large gap issue.   
5.2.3.10 Heavy-metal transport 
The models used for heavy-metal transport are similar to those used for general FPT.  The heavy-
metal transport issue does not appear to be great, as the amount of plutonium or americium transport 
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at NGNP temperatures is expected to be very small.  Data for transport through the coating layers are 
very limited, but the diffusion coefficients appear to be very small.  Sorption and diffusional transport 
in graphite at the temperatures of interest are expected to be small.  Americium is more volatile, but 
unless the NGNP is fueled with transuranic elements, heavy-metal transport is unlikely to be a major 
issue.  A review of the recent literature may be appropriate as recent work in fuel recycling may shed 
some new light on the issue and bring the HTGR community knowledge up to date. 
5.2.3.11 Reactor building transport 
Once the FPs have escaped the primary circuit and entered into the reactor building, several 
processes exist for their removal from the building atmosphere.  These include condensation, 
deposition, and settling.  These processes have been studied for some time for LWR applications; it is 
assumed that recent work in this area will be available to the NGNP designers.  Potential differences 
include the dry environment, particle size and shape, and the possible greater importance of electrical 
charging mechanisms.  In the past, codes such as PARDISEKO, CARCAS, CONTAIN, and GOTHIC 
have been used.  It is believed that more modern codes or updated versions of these codes will be 
used to analyze the NGNP situation, and that a large knowledge gap is probably unlikely. 
The transport in the confinement will be sensitive to the actual design of the building.  Obviously, 
a vented building will allow a rapid flow path out of the building and less opportunity for settling, 
while enhanced containment offers more opportunity for FP removal prior to any gas venting.   
As with the LWR case, mechanisms that allow the conversion of inorganic iodine to its organic 
forms are important and may form a part of the safety analysis case, depending on the building 
design. 
Note that there have been updates to the licensing support documents since many of the past 
calculations for accident doses have been computed [5-22].  The computational methods and their 
application to the current regulations should be reviewed as past methods may now be obsolete.  
5.2.4 Relevant Material or Component Data Over the Range of Interest and the Data 
Uncertainty 
While a considerable amount of data has been collected over the years, much of these data are not 
directly useful for the NGNP because of NGNP’s higher temperatures of operation, the super alloys 
needed for the power system components, and changes in graphite type [5-5, 5-13, 5-16].  The higher 
temperatures and different materials will likely require a new set of experiments to collect diffusion, 
sorption, chemical attack, and permeation data.  Graphites can have different transport properties due 
to differences in their coke source and manufacturing, so graphite transport property and air/steam 
erosion data specific to the design material will have to be collected.  Also, the metal alloys of interest 
are different from those of the past.  The previous section detailed some of the data impacts. 
One complicating issue is that the transport properties are sensitive to the material surface 
condition and the chemical form of the FP; helium impurities will likely set the oxygen potential of 
the system and the species to be included in an analysis.  Another difficulty is that associated with 
aging.  One will have to estimate the surface qualities of the reactor system components after many 
years of operation.  Some means of determining the effects of operational upsets will have to be 
incorporated in the plan to determine if any unusual behavior will occur if water, oil, or some other 
(decontamination?) fluid is introduced into the reactor circuit.  The Peach Bottom HTGR had a 
carbonaceous film on the reactor circuit components from an oil leak from a helium compressor.  This 
film was believed to modify the cesium sorptivity of the circuit [5-16].   
Surface films may have to be examined for long-term growth and friability since they are 
dependent on FP holdup during accident conditions.  The diffusion of FPs into the base metal may be 
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advantageous in this respect, although decontamination would be more difficult.  The 
decommissioning of past gas-cooled reactors may supply useful data for this determination. 
One item of concern for aging is component replacement.  New materials may be used to 
overcome operational problems, and if FP retention is part of the function of the component, these 
new materials may have to undergo testing for transport properties as well.  This is a potentially time-
consuming and expensive process, so a testing plan that could generate material type data that could 
be applied over a class of materials would be beneficial to the program.   
Of particular interest are any turbine or power conversion components that may have to be 
decontaminated prior to maintenance.  Two situations are of interest.  The first is the initial collection 
of FPs while in the reactor circuit.  The second is the decontamination of the component and the new 
surface state of the component after decontamination, and whether the new surface of the component 
is more or less transport active.   
If a component is called upon to retain FPs during an accident, it effectively becomes part of the 
reactor safety system, and its long-term ability to retain FPs becomes a matter of concern.  Since FP 
retention is sensitive to surface state and the chemical form of the FP, some means of predicting the 
long-term stability of this retention behavior becomes desirable.  This problem is related to general 
component aging, but in an unusual way as gas impurities or the mechanical stability of a thin film 
rather than actual component failure could defeat the component’s FP retention ability.  Unless the 
reactor circuit parts are periodically cleaned, the long-term stability of the plate-out, films, and 
deposits could be a knowledge gap issue if their retention is required for the safety case. 
5.2.5 The Reactor Component and Confinement/Containment Configuration and Their 
Relative Roles in the Safety Case 
This is probably the major issue in any gap assessment; the respective roles of the reactor circuit 
and containment or confinement system must be known before their modeling adequacy can be 
determined.  As mentioned earlier, the reactor designers are faced with a knowledge/capital trade-off.  
It may be advantageous to focus design effort on relatively well-understood components such as 
filters and structures rather than to enter into the complex world of nuclear component testing under 
extreme conditions.  On the other hand, great costs saving may be possible if credit can be taken for 
FP retention within the reactor circuit. 
In any event, the adequacy of the modeling will depend on the safety functional analysis.  
Detailed transport calculations may be required for one approach while bounding estimates may be 
suitable for another.  Past trade studies have been conducted for variations on the vented confinement 
approach, and they tend to point to the great advantage of taking credit for reactor system FP 
retention; however, the NGNP is not bound to the past, and new approaches may be forthcoming. 
Once the source term has been estimated, one needs to budget the FP holdup among the fuel 
form, reactor circuit components, mobile elements such as dust, and the reactor building.  Depending 
on the particular design, one may be able to use bounding assumptions about transport rather than 
mechanistic calculations for some part of the path between the fuel form and the environment, 
although the current approach may not be able to employ this simplification.  In principle, this 
allocation of attenuation and holdup will allow the designer and regulator to concentrate resources on 
the most important part of the transport path or to shift away from the components that are the most 
difficult to analyze or test by adding additional attenuation in other components that are easier to 
analyze and test. 
Thus, to begin closing the gap and to proceed, 
1. the transport pathway for the accidents of interest should be outlined; 
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2. the FPs to be retained and the goal attenuation factor for each step (serial or parallel) 
along the way should be detailed; and 
3. the local (accident) operating environment for each step or component in the path should 
be determined. 
This is perhaps the first gap to be closed—the first details of the actual safety approach.  Without 
this information, the regulators would have to guess as to the safety path to be taken.  While the 
literature and presentations have sketched out a design approach, this may not be the only approach, 
and this approach requires the collection of a lot of data and extensive testing—at great expense.   
5.2.6 Computational Software or Other Methods for Determining the Quantitative Results 
Over the decades, a host of software has been generated for FPT analysis in gas-cooled reactors 
[5-2, 5-4, 5-6, 5-13, and 5-15].  Two long-term difficulties have been encountered.  The first is simply 
data collection for the models.  Even for the simple models, a large amount of data is required 
because of the wide range of temperatures, materials, and chemical conditions that may be 
encountered under both normal and accident conditions.  Only a part of this information can be 
collected out-of-pile, since radiation-induced changes in the materials can affect the transport 
properties, especially in materials like graphite.  In addition, these properties are sensitive to the 
actual microstructure of the materials, so the use of generic rather than specific material properties is 
seldom possible.  Therefore there is a shortage of data for the particular materials of interest at the 
conditions of interest.   
The second issue is integral testing.  The most realistic way to conduct integral testing is in an in-
pile loop.  This type of testing is expensive and has many inherent limitations due to reactor safety 
and operational issues.  Even with these limitations, a fair amount of in-pile testing has been done 
with mostly reasonable agreement with the models, although there have been some anomalies, and 
the uncertainties are large [5-6, 5-13, 5-16].  This is of particular interest for the V&V of the 
computer codes, as it provides an overall test of the models and software. 
Over the years, a suite of codes has been developed for FPT analysis by both the gas-cooled 
reactor and LWR (containment transport) communities.  It is difficult to evaluate the suitability of the 
software, but it is probably safe to say that initially, data for the materials of interest and a method to 
conduct integral tests under the desired accident conditions are the main problems.   
The existing models and codes are likely to be good starting points in most cases unless detailed 
micro-structural elements are required for the calculations, or accuracy levels better than roughly an 
order of magnitude are required for the design.  To proceed with this topic, the following two 
requirements must be met: 
1. A description of the physical models and the reactor configuration. Much of this is 
available in one form or another, and the reactor design is forthcoming.  A more difficult 
problem is showing that the models are appropriate for the conditions of interest. 
2. The data required for the models.  These data are composed of two types:  single-effects 
data for each material and component acquired under individual testing and integral data 
designed to show that the codes get the correct answer for a complete system under the 
conditions of interest. 
These needs are related to the safety pathway needs because the release and release uncertainty 
demands will influence the degree of modeling and data collection necessary.  In fact, the two interact 
because one would like to credit the best-understood and least-expensive pathway or component with 
the most FP attenuation or retention to minimize development time and capital cost. 
The major gaps are likely to be in the areas of data collection and proof that the selected model is 
adequate under all the normal and accident conditions of interest.  In the end, even if the transport 
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cannot be calculated exactly, one would like a model that envelops the releases, and some reasonable 
proof that the model predicts, in fact, an upper limit. 
5.2.7 Integral Testing Over a Wide Range of Conditions to Support the Computational 
Methods and Their Uncertainty 
This task is perhaps the most difficult issue the NGNP designers face—proving that the codes and 
models reproduce reality.  As was mentioned previously, an in-pile loop that can be subjected to 
operational upsets is likely to be the best means available for integral accident testing.  It may be 
possible to do a very limited amount of accident testing on current test reactors, but safety limitations 
will probably place great restraints on this activity. 
A fair number of in-pile loop tests have been conducted over the years, but a loop suitable for the 
NGNP program may not be available as most of the past loops are not available.  Past testing has 
revealed reasonable agreement with the codes in many areas, but several tests have had anomalies 
that could not be explained by the simpler transport codes [5-6, 5-13, 5-16].  Thus, a first area of 
inquiry would be to use past data to re-examine the current transport models and codes.  This may or 
may not be possible because the relevant data needed by the models may not have been collected. 
The planning of any in-pile loop program would require a fairly complete description of the 
normal operating environment and of the accidents, along with any scaling factors.  Rather extensive 
modeling will be necessary both to design the loop as well as determine the off-normal conditions 
that the loop can be expected to simulate.  Finally, the model predictions (with the previously 
collected single-effects data) will need to be made. 
5.3 CLOSING THE GAPS—STAGES OF MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
5.3.1 Near-Term Approaches 
At this early stage in the development of the NGNP, the actual path for the safety case is unclear 
or how the designers plan to meet the regulations; however, based on a historical approach using the 
filtered/vented reactor building design, several general gaps are apparent. 
1. Regulators need a comprehensive description of the NGNP safety philosophy, a listing of 
the components involved, and the conditions under which these components are expected 
to perform their safety functions.  The regulators also need an explanation of how this 
philosophy meets the defense-in-depth approach and, in particular, answers to the 
following: 
i. Will the components that perform a safety function (retain FPs) be classified as 
safety-related components with the imposition of equipment qualification, in-service 
inspections, and/or technical specifications limiting conditions for operation and 
surveillance requirements? 
ii. How will aging issues be addressed?  If the safety function of a component is to 
retain FPs on its surface during adverse conditions, how can it be ensured that this 
function can be retained for long periods (decades) despite the possible presence of 
other long-term surface degradation mechanisms? 
iii. Will the surface state of a nonreplaceable or difficult-to-replace component be re-
activated by chemical action or cleaning during its service life? 
2. A sound basis for the selection of the physical models and the data for these models must 
be justified.  A host of transport mechanisms has been identified for the NGNP, and 
unlike other reactor concepts, the safety case greatly depends on the knowledge of these 
mechanisms under extreme conditions (high temperatures) as a high-pressure 
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containment (traditionally) has not been part of the design to contain releases; the internal 
reactor components themselves perform a major FP retention role during at least part of 
the accident.  While some comparison work between codes and testing has been done, 
there are anomalies.  The introduction of multiplicative numerical factors into the 
computations to add conservatism to the design calculations must be justified on physical 
grounds rather than by an arbitrary factor to envelop conjectured uncertainties.  In the 
case of pressure boundary breeches, mechanical shock and pipe whip effects on 
desorption and lift-off must be included. 
3. The materials to be used and their sensitivity on the transport case must be identified.  
The particular-vs-generic transport properties of the materials must be evaluated.  It has 
been common in past nuclear systems to replace materials (and add substances to the 
coolant) because of operational shortfalls or the need for system improvements, and the 
transport safety case may be sensitive to the (changeable) surface state of component 
materials.  How can one be sure this situation will not occur, or if it does, will the 
required testing be possible late in the reactor life if the component plays an essential 
transport role? 
4. Once the actual reactor design is available, the transport pathways that result from the 
accident conditions must be identified along with the relevant models and data needed for 
the resulting calculations.  The actual design will be key to the analysis as the results to 
date have been focused on a conjectured configuration which may or may not be a good 
model for planning future work.  The identification of margins, sensitivities, and possible 
mitigating actions by the reactor operator needs to be determined. 
5. Technical specifications for the maximum acceptable FP loading of key components 
must be determined along with practical methods of ensuring that the levels can be 
determined during normal operation.  A recovery plan for handling and recovering from 
exceeding the limits should be identified.  
6. The fuel database must be developed as well as fuel-failure models and fuel material 
properties (both measurable and process controlled).  Past work has identified pyrocarbon 
as important for the structural stability of the particle and silicon carbide for both strength 
and as a diffusion barrier. 
This list is not meant to be comprehensive; it is to serve as a starting point for the review of the 
safety case.  It is anticipated that much of this information will be supplied as the NGNP design 
proceeds. 
With the above issues in mind, the regulators and reviewers will also need to consider the 
following (these may be policy issues to be answered at a later date, depending on the course of 
events): 
• How exactly should the defense in depth and enhanced safety be defined and achieved?  
HTGR FPT as defined to date has replaced the traditional solid barriers and robust filters 
with complex physical deposition mechanisms that can be sensitive to the local 
environment.  Only limited large-scale testing has been done. 
• There is a large amount of past work in the field, both national and international; 
however, much of the work was conducted under varying quality assurance conditions in 
a host of countries.  Can this body of data be used to minimize the requirements for future 
testing? 
• The designers appear to be calling for a mechanistic source term based on some rather 
complex physical transport modeling, heavy reliance on fuel performance, modest 
confinement building performance, and limited emergency planning zones.  Can these 
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four issues be reconciled with the very limited large-scale experience with this concept 
and the few mitigation features available for use during an accident? 
5.3.1.1 Considerations in attempting modeling gap mitigation in the near term 
The traditional FP modeling approach used for gas-cooled reactor accident evaluation has been to 
model each step in the transport pathway from fuel to the atmosphere for each FP of interest. 
Although some judgments have been applied as to which FP nuclides and which steps are most urgent 
to model, paring back somewhat the amount of data and number of required models, this approach 
has led to a proliferation of models with great demands for data.  Moreover, the experiments on which 
these models are based are generally expensive because (1) radioactive material is usually involved, 
requiring special facilities, (2) many difficult issues of chemistry and physics are involved, and (3) 
experimental conditions are often extreme and hence difficult to achieve. 
5.3.1.2 Considerations regarding the need for gap mitigation 
Because of the above reasons and others, history shows that experiments on which FP models are 
based are often under-funded, with compromises as to the amount of data taken, with insufficient 
replication for assessment of accuracy, and compromises as to the attainment of required 
experimental conditions. This, together with difficult physics such as for particle adhesion, liftoff 
under vibrating high-flow conditions, and diffusion in a radiation field, has led to the traditionally 
high-error bars normally seen for FPT models. 
Consider the consequence of stringing together perhaps five (or more) such models, from the fuel 
through the containment, to obtain the release. The result is the typical multidecade error bar. This 
uncertainty puts a burden on all aspects of proving safety, especially on fuel integrity requirements. 
This is not meant to discourage the historical approach; rather, it is meant to focus on a systematic 
approach to testing and data collection.  The goal should be to minimize the total transport uncertainty 
rather than the uncertainty of any particular transport step.  In the past, integral experiments have 
been proposed to examine the predictions made by single effects testing.  This global testing can be 
very valuable to help bound the uncertainty.  
The irony is that all indications are that FP releases are quite low even for the most serious 
accidents, yet development of the numerous individual release models requires great expense and 
long lead times, and ends up with a predictive method with large uncertainty bands.  Adoption of this 
traditional approach for the NGNP would lead to a financial and lead time burden that perhaps may 
be avoided by an alternative approach.  The regulator should anticipate creative approaches to the 
NGNP as the traditional approach may burden the project unnecessarily.  
5.3.2 Intermediate- and Long-Term Approaches 
5.3.2.1 Gap mitigation by means of integral experiments  
One method for avoiding the need for developing a large number of FPT models is to determine 
FP release directly from integral experiments.  For this method to realistically replace individual 
modeling, (1) the final chosen materials must be used, that is, prototypic fuel, graphite, and primary 
system alloys; and (2) an acceptable range of experimental conditions must be employed. 
One option to consider is the actual use of a demonstration reactor for at least some of the FP 
release testing.  It is possible that some data could be obtained from operating international test 
reactors.  This approach not only avoids the time and expense of developing numerous FPT models 
but also has the potential for shrinking the error bars on the release. It is difficult to estimate the value 
of rendering more precise FP release estimates, but the benefit may be large.  Particularly, some 
development pressure on fuel behavior may be mitigated by relieving the need for designing for the 
large transport uncertainty.  
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This approach is not presented as a certain alternative method but only as an attractive idea that 
may be explored by a designer. Whether it proves practical or not depends on some close evaluation 
of the particular details required for integral experimentation and the operating envelope of the test 
reactors.  
5.3.2.2 Modeling gap mitigation by using filtered confinement 
Employing an always-filtered confinement with a proven FP capture efficiency does not eliminate 
the need for conventional FPT modeling. However, it does alleviate the importance of reducing error 
bars on the release estimates and, consequently, on the expense of the individual experimentation 
required for developing the models.   
To avoid confusion at this point, note that the concept involves at least the following three filter 
options: 
• A reactor building with a vent that opens up only during an over-pressurization event 
such as a large reactor pipe break; the helium is discharged directly to the environment 
through the vent.  After the pressure surge is over, or for small leaks, the vent is closed 
and the helium release from the reactor is handled by the building heating, ventilating, 
and air conditioning (HVAC) system or simply leaks out. 
• A filtered/vented reactor building with a vent that opens up during an over-pressurization 
event such as a large reactor pipe break; the helium is discharged directly to the 
environment.  After the pressure surge is over or for small leaks, the vent closes and any 
further releases from the reactor are routed through filters prior to release to the 
environment.  This option only requires a modest filter unit. 
• An always-filtered reactor building that passes all the reactor cavity effluent through a 
filter system.  Since this filter system must handle the large sudden release from a major 
primary circuit break, it will be a large robust unit. 
The first two options have been proposed as design options; the third is the subject of this section.  
It is not a trivial addition to the project. 
As a hypothetical illustration, suppose that 1 Ci of 137Cs is the desired accident release limit, but 
model predictions indicate a range from 0.1 to 10 Ci. A two-decade uncertainty is not atypical for 
such an estimate. The situation as it stands could very well already be satisfactory, but because of the 
modeling uncertainty, some improvement must be made, possibly by higher fuel retention, for 
reducing the upper-limit bound. This is an illustration of how uncertainty in FPT modeling can lead to 
increased fuel development costs or demand other mitigation means. 
If a 95% efficient always-filtered confinement (no direct venting under any condition) were used, 
the very same set of models and accident conditions would predict 0.005 to 0.5 Ci 137Cs release. The 
effect of the filter is to place the upper bound within specification limits. The filter thus enables 
satisfactory results with less precise models. Possibly also, the 95% efficient filter may permit some 
uncertainty as to the materials (or even the fuels) used for the experimentation, permitting use of 
historically developed models employing out-of-date materials.   
Large filters (sand and fiberglass) have been used by the DOE in radiochemical processing plants, 
and design improvements in large-scale filters could make them of interest to the NGNP [5-11, 
5-23].  Other gas-cleaning devices such as acoustic agglomerators, scrubbers, precipitators, and 
cyclones have been considered as emergency air-cleaning devices in both once-through and re-
circulating systems.  If dust is truly an issue, filter plugging will need to be addressed.  Reference 
5-23 discusses many of these filtering, flow, and plugging issues for a sodium-cooled reactor, and 
while sodium aerosols are considered rather than carbon, the flow, filter plugging, reliability, and size 
issues are similar.  There is considerable literature on gas cleaning devices.  They tend to be 
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reasonably well understood, and testing is much easier than nuclear system testing.  Because they are 
separate from the nuclear systems, they follow the traditional defense-in-depth philosophy in a 
straightforward manner and can be tested in isolation.  Cost may be an issue, however. 
Filters may also impact a containment design.  In the unlikely event that the NGNP proceeds with 
a traditional containment, most of the containment analysis tools will be available since containments 
have been well studied by LWR designers.  However, one new issue with the containment is that 
helium, unlike steam, is noncondensable, and a means of relieving the pressure in the containment 
will be necessary.  This could be done with some sort of vent filter as has been explored for European 
LWR reactors [5-20 through 5-22].   
A filter system was installed on the Los Alamos Ultra High-Temperature Reactor Experiment 
(UHTREX), a small gas-cooled test reactor, and a filter system was chosen to handle the effluent 
under accident conditions [5-24, 5-25].  This is a small-scale system but serves to illustrate a practical 
application.   
A major issue is the impact of the (always in place) filters on the confinement design of the 
NGNP.  If there is a significant pressure increase in the building during accidents because of flow 
resistance, the building will have to be fortified to withstand the pressure or made larger to lower the 
pressure, both resulting in cost increases above and beyond the increased cost of the larger filter 
system.  However, these costs will have to be weighed against the program costs of collecting FPT 
and fuel qualification data, as well as any setbacks that may occur in the process.  The magnitude of 
the design problem may be reduced if a “leak-before-break” assumption is acceptable and if this 
“leak” is of a manageable size, as the resulting pressure surge could be much smaller with the 
accompanying reduced demand on the building and filters.  These are designer issues rather than 
regulator issues, but the regulator must anticipate a range of possible solutions at this early stage of 
NGNP development and be prepared for creative trade-offs. 
Considering the above, it may be prudent to examine the following: 
• the state of the art in radiological filter design, the potential for large-scale filtering, and 
the likely filter attenuation required for the NGNP; 
• the degree to which FPT uncertainty can be mitigated and compensated for; 
• the impact a radiological filter may have on the design and operation of the reactor 
building; 
• the impact of the filter concept on the licensing process, negative interactions with the 
other parts of plant, and associated requirements for the FPT task; and 
• the possible relaxation of reactor system component performance and safety issues. 
While the regulator should be prepared to follow the current safety issues based on a vented or a 
filtered/vented confinement, one should also anticipate creative solutions designed to avoid the 
difficult and expensive tasks associated with the intricacies of FPT physics and chemistry. 
5.4 SUMMARY 
In considering predicted FPT and releases to the environs in the case of Generation IV reactors 
such as NGNP, a mitigating factor is that an NGNP major design objective is to employ passive 
safety features that limit reactor responses in all plausible accident scenarios such that no significant 
fuel failure and FP releases occur.  To the extent that the NGNP design successfully meets this 
objective, the burden of proof for estimating potential FPT and releases outside the confinement area 
is lessened.  In those postulated events where FPT is an issue, the associated phenomena to be dealt 
with are complicated.  In addition, the coefficients and other parameters in the FPT models often have 
very large uncertainties.  The NGNP program will first have to identify and characterize the materials 
of interest and the reactor design and safety case before this uncertainty can be reduced, especially if 
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a vented confinement option is used.  A host of past data, models, and computer codes are available to 
begin this task, but the sensitivity of the materials to the specific operating environment will limit the 
amount of past data that can be applied directly to this design.  It is likely that a considerable amount 
of testing would be necessary. 
The major FPT phenomena of interest identified in the PIRT exercise [1-1] are well covered in 
this report.  The primary issues noted related to particulars of the confinement design (which would 
have a major impact on “gap priorities”), are FP releases via normal helium leakage, and the effects 
of dust-borne FPs and mechanical shock and vibrations during rapid discharge in a D-LOFC accident. 
It is believed that through a concerted effort, the required data can be obtained and the necessary 
models confirmed or developed, leading to a FPT code for the NGNP.  Some of this effort is under 
way for the international projects.  It may also be possible to take advantage of operating test reactors 
to obtain pertinent information.  However, at present, these paths are likely to be expensive and time-
consuming, so the designers may look for alternative solutions to this issue to accelerate NGNP 
development.  Thus, the regulator may find it prudent to be prepared to entertain other ideas such as 
large filters capable of handling the high flow of a depressurization event.  
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6. HIGH-TEMPERATURE MATERIALS 
This section provides background information on development issues for the major structural 
components and materials, including metallic and some nonmetallic materials, as needed for modular 
HTGR service (graphite is covered in Sect. 7).  The phenomena potentially influencing reactor safety, 
as identified in the PIRT exercises [1-1], are described and addressed for each of the significant areas, 
along with information about the phenomena identified as technology gaps.  Where gaps are evident, 
data needs are compared with the available data and analysis tools.  Solutions for addressing the gaps 
are noted where appropriate. 
6.1 MAJOR PHENOMENA OF INTEREST 
The major aspects of materials degradation phenomena that may give rise to regulatory safety 
concern for the NGNP were evaluated for major structural components and the materials comprising 
them, including metallic and nonmetallic materials for control rods, other reactor internals, and 
primary circuit components; metallic alloys for very high-temperature service for heat exchangers and 
turbomachinery; metallic alloys for high-temperature service for the RPV and other pressure vessels 
and components in the primary and secondary circuits; and metallic alloys for secondary heat transfer 
circuits and the BOP.  These materials phenomena were primarily evaluated with regard to their 
potential for contributing to FP release at the site boundary under a variety of event scenarios 
covering normal operation, anticipated transients, and accidents. 
Of all the high-temperature metallic components, the one most likely to be heavily challenged in 
the NGNP will be the IHX.  Its thin internal sections must be able to withstand the stresses associated 
with thermal loading and pressure drops between the primary and secondary loops under the 
environments and temperatures of interest.  Several important materials-related phenomena related to 
the IHX were identified, including crack initiation and propagation; the lack of experience of primary 
boundary-design methodology limitations for new IHX structures; and manufacturing phenomena for 
new designs. 
Specific issues were also identified for RPVs that will likely be too large for shop fabrication and 
transportation.  Validated procedures for on-site welding, post-weld heat treatment (PWHT), and 
inspections will be required for the materials of construction. High-importance phenomena related to 
the RPV include crack initiation and subcritical crack growth; field fabrication process control; 
property control in heavy sections; and the maintenance of high emissivity of the RPV materials over 
their service lifetime to enable passive heat rejection from the reactor core.  All identified phenomena 
related to the materials of construction for the IHX, RPV, and other components were evaluated and 
ranked for their potential impact on reactor safety. 
The phenomena ranked by the PIRT panel with high importance and low or medium knowledge 
bases are of the utmost concern and should have the highest priority for research effort.  Similarly, 
phenomena with a medium importance rank and low or medium knowledge base are of concern and 
should have moderate priority for research effort.  
Thus, the following phenomena represent the most significant technology/data gaps based on 
their high importance ranking with only a low or medium knowledge ranking. 
6.1.1 Phenomena Ranked Importance—High, Knowledge—Low 
RPV Rack Initiation and Subcritical Crack Growth 
The PMR candidate RPV material, 9Cr–1 Mo steel (grade 91), must be assessed for crack growth 
phenomena due to transients and operationally induced thermal loading, pressure loading, residual 
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stress, and the presence of existing flaws (degradation of welds, cyclic loading, low cycle fatigue).  
There is a limited database from fossil energy applications at NGNP PMR temperatures.  Low-cycle 
fatigue data in air, vacuum, and sodium (Argonne National Laboratory unpublished data) at 482ºC 
show life is longest in sodium, followed by vacuum and air.  Aging degradation in helium (depending 
on impurities) will most likely be greater than in air.  Aging in impure helium may perhaps depend on 
impurity type and content [6-1 through 6-4].  Due to limited data at the requisite temperature, the 
panel rated this phenomenon’s knowledge level low. 
Compromise of RPV Surface Emissivity Due to Loss of Desired Surface Layer Properties 
To ensure passive safety, high emissivity of the RPV is required to limit RPV and core 
temperatures.  High emissivities must be maintained on both inside and outside surfaces of the RPV.  
Formation and control of surface layers must be considered under both helium and air environments.  
There are limited studies on ferritic stainless steels proposed for the PMR RPV and on SA 508 carbon 
steel proposed for the PBR RPV that show the potential for maintaining high emissivity under 
expected operational environmental conditions.  The panel rated this phenomenon’s knowledge level 
low. 
RPV Material Properties Degradation During Field Fabrication 
There are significant questions about the site of the NGNP and whether a factory-fabricated RPV 
can be shipped to a remote sire for the first unit (proposed to be located in Idaho).  Fabrication 
process control must address field fabrication because of vessel size [including welding, post-weld 
heat treatment, section thickness (especially with 9Cr–1 Mo steel), and pre-service inspection].  Fossil 
energy experience indicates that caution must be taken. On-site nuclear vessel fabrication is 
unprecedented [6-1 through 6-4].  The panel rated this phenomenon’s knowledge level low. 
RPV Material Property Control in Heavy Sections 
Heavy-section properties are difficult to obtain because of hardenability issues.  Adequate large 
ingot metallurgy technology does not exist for 9Cr–1 Mo steel proposed for the PMR RPV.  
Maintaining fracture toughness, micro-structural control, and mechanical properties in the through-
wall thickness of heavy sections of 9Cr ferritic alloy materials must be maintained.  Very limited data 
exist with even less on materials over 3 to 4 in. in section thickness.  There is very limited data 
available for specimens from 300-mm-thick forgings, and these data show thick-section properties 
lower than thin-section properties [6-1 through 6-4].  The panel rated this phenomenon’s knowledge 
level low. 
Aging Fatigue, Environmental Degradation of Insulation Materials 
The major concern is about insulation debris plugging core cooling channels causing fuel damage 
due to local overheating.  The debris would be chunks of internal insulation falling off or being swept 
off by helium coolant flow; ceramic sleeves or carbon–carbon composites would be the most likely 
source of such debris.  Little system-relevant information about insulation failure mechanisms is 
available [6-3 through 6-12].  The panel rated this phenomenon’s knowledge level low. 
IHX Crack Initiation and Propagation 
Environmental effects (creep crack growth, creep, creep-fatigue, aging) must be addressed with 
regard to subcritical crack growth, subject to impacts of design issues, particularly for thin-section 
alloy structures.  Stresses on the IHX (both thin and thick sections) can lead to these failure 
phenomena.  Thermal transients can cause loss-of-toughness concerns.  Carbide redistribution as a 
function of thermal stress and loading direction can change through-wall-thickness properties.  More 
is known about Inconel 617 from HTGR and industry usage than for Haynes 230.  Both environment 
and creep play significant roles in initiation and cyclic crack growth rate of Inconel 617 and Haynes 
230.  Mechanistic models for predicting damage development and failure criteria for time-dependent 
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phenomena have to be developed to enable conservative extrapolation from short-term laboratory test 
data to long-term design life [6-3 through 6-12].  The panel rated this phenomenon’s knowledge level 
low. 
Primary Boundary Failures in Compact IHX—Role of Design Methods  
Time-dependent design criteria for complex structures need to be developed and verified by 
structural testing.  ASME Code–approved simplified methods have not been proven and are not 
permitted for compact IHX components.  There is no experience for the complex shape IHX nor for 
designing and operating such high-temperature components in the class 1 environment. Difficulties of 
design and analyses of compact IHX are discussed in the Refs. 6-3 through 6-12.  The panel rated this 
phenomenon’s knowledge level low. 
Primary Boundary Failures in Compact IHX—Role of Manufacturing Controls (Such as Joining) 
Compact heat exchanger (CHE) cores (if used) will require advanced machining, forming, and 
joining (e.g., diffusion bonding, brazing, etc.) methods that may impact component integrity during 
operation and aging at high-temperature operating conditions.  CHEs must be assessed against the 
option of using traditional tube and shell concepts.  However, these phenomena related to degradation 
and failure are generic and extend beyond the CHEs to all the very high-temperature heat exchangers.  
The panel rated this phenomenon’s knowledge level low. 
Primary Boundary Failures in Compact IHX—Role of Inspection/Testing Regime 
Traditional nondestructive examination (NDE) methods will not work for CHEs because of 
geometrical constraints.  Proof-testing of some kind will be required (maybe leak testing with tracer). 
Pre-service testing will be difficult, and in-service testing will be even more so.  Condition 
monitoring may be useful.  Traditional approaches to preoperational testing, pre-service inspection, 
fitness-for-service tests, and the use of leak tests provide very little knowledge base here.  Margins to 
failure should be determined by some method other than detecting failures after they occur [6-3 
through 6-12].  The panel rated this phenomenon’s knowledge level low. 
Control Rod Insertion Failures—Role of Composites Structural Design Nethods 
Carbon-carbon composites are prime candidates for high-temperature control rod clad but need 
approved methods of designing, proof testing, model testing, testing standards, design methods, and 
validation testing.  Some code work is being developed by the American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers (ASME) and the American Society for Testing and Metals (ASTM).  Extensive aerospace 
industry design and usage can be assessed for applicability [6-6 through 6-12].  The panel rated this 
phenomenon’s knowledge level low. 
Compromise of In-Vessel Surfaces Emissivities 
To ensure passive cooling and safety during LOFC, a high emissivity value of the core barrel is 
required to limit core temperatures.  High emissivities must be maintained on both inside and outside 
surfaces. Formation and control of surface layers must be considered under high-temperature helium 
environments with potential impurities present.  Limited studies on austenitic stainless steel and on 
SA 508 carbon steel show potential for maintaining high emissivity [6-2 through 6-4 and 6-13 
through 6-15].  The panel rated this phenomenon’s knowledge level low. 
Irradiation-Induced Creep of In-Vessel Metallic Structures 
Irradiation creep and dimensional changes particularly for Alloy 800H at moderately low dose 
should be assessed.  Alloy 800 is a primary candidate material for both the core barrel and core 
support floor, as well as control rod cladding.  Little information on irradiation creep is available for 
Alloy 800H [6-2 through 6-4 and 6-13 through 6-15].  The panel rated this phenomenon’s knowledge 
level low. 
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Core Radial Restraint Failure—Role of Composites Structural Design and Fabrication Methods 
Carbon-carbon composites are prime candidates for core restraint structures but need approved 
design methods.  The needs include methods for proof testing, model testing, testing standards, 
validation tests, handling of scalability issues and fabrication issues, and probabilistic methods of 
design.  Applications in large-scale (meters in diameter) structures, as well as smaller ones, must be 
addressed. Extensive experience exists within the aerospace industry, but applicability must be 
assessed [6-6 through 6-12].  The panel rated this phenomenon’s knowledge level low. 
Environmental and Irradiation Degradation and Thermal Stability of Fibrous Insulation 
Relatively low dose and exposure is expected, but LOFC can result in temperatures high enough 
to challenge stability of fibrous insulation such as Kaowool.  There is a need to assess candidate 
materials for the effects on micro-structural stability and thermo-physical properties during irradiation 
and high-temperature exposure in impure helium. Limited commercial information is available for 
conditions of interest [6-6 through 6-12].  The panel rated this phenomenon’s knowledge level low. 
Isolation Valve Failure 
Isolation valve failure (including categories such as self-welding, galling, seizing) is possible.  
Concerns about isolation valves are similar to “breach to secondary” issues on IHX because they 
would provide barriers to secondary heat transport system.  Information is possibly available from 
previously constructed HTGRs, but relevance of any such information needs to be assessed.  State of 
knowledge about helium-leak-tightness in large valves is unknown [6-2 through 6-4].  The panel rated 
this phenomenon’s knowledge level low. 
Other Valve Failures 
Concerns about a variety of valve failure mechanisms that will be design dependent include 
categories such as self-welding, galling, and seizing.  These valves and their materials will need to be 
assessed once design-specific details are available.  Helium tribology issues must be considered.  
Allowable identified and unidentified coolant leakage rates must be established.  Information may be 
available from previously constructed HTGRs, but relevance needs to be assessed [6-2 through 6-4].  
The panel rated this phenomenon’s knowledge level low. 
6.1.2 Phenomena Ranked Importance—High, Knowledge—Medium 
RPV Thermal Aging (Long Term) 
For the PMR, the requirement for a 60-year lifetime requires that the uncertainty be reduced in 
the properties of 9Cr–1 Mo steel (grade 91), especially for the degradation and aging of base metals 
and welds for a critical component such as the RPV.  It is assumed that Grade 91 is the prime 
candidate for the PMR as the NGNP, and no back-up material has been proposed nor is considered 
here for the candidate PMR without active RPV wall cooling.  This is beyond the experience base for 
conditions of interest, extensive fossil energy experience, and code usage although significant aging 
data exist at high temperatures (500ºC).  The need is for long-term aging data at NGNP-relevant 
temperatures [6-1 through 6-4].  Therefore, the panel rated this phenomenon’s knowledge level as 
medium. 
6.2 PHYSICAL AND SUPPORTING MODEL ASPECTS 
Physical aspects for modeling high-temperature metallic components include the following: 
• inelastic materials behavior for materials, times, and temperatures for very high-
temperature structures (e.g., creep, fatigue, creep-fatigue); 
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• adequacy and applicability of current ASME Code allowables with respect to service 
times and temperatures for operational stresses; 
• adequacy and applicability of current state of high-temperature design methodology (e.g., 
constitutive models, complex loading, failure criteria, flaw assessment methods); 
• effects of product form and section thickness; 
• joining methods including welding, diffusion bonding, and issues associated with 
dissimilar materials in structural components; 
• effects of irradiation on materials strength, ductility, and toughness; 
• degradation mechanisms and inspectability; 
• oxidation, carburization, decarburization, and nitriding of metallic components in impure 
helium and helium-nitrogen; 
• micro-structural stability during long-term aging in environment; 
• effects of short  and long term on mechanical properties (e.g., tensile, fatigue, creep, 
creep-fatigue, ductility, toughness); 
• high-velocity erosion/corrosion; 
• rapid oxidation of graphite and carbon-carbon composites during air-ingress accidents; 
• compatibility with heat-transfer media and reactants for hydrogen generation; and 
• development and stability of surface layers on RPV and core barrel affecting emissivity. 
Physical aspects for designing and modeling high-temperature structural composites (such as 
carbon-carbon or silicon carbide–silicon carbide) include the following: 
• effects of composite component selection and infiltration method; 
• effects of architecture and weave; 
• materials properties up to and including very high temperatures (e.g., strength, fracture, 
creep, corrosion, thermal shock resistance); 
• effects of irradiation on materials strength and dimensional stability; 
• fabrication scaling processes; 
• adequacy and validation of design methods; and 
• degradation mechanisms and inspectability. 
6.3 CLOSING THE GAPS—STAGES OF MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
6.3.1 Near Term 
It is necessary to initiate as soon as possible development of the data and models needed by 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code Subcommittees to formulate time-dependent failure 
criteria that will ensure adequate life and safety for metallic materials in the NGNP.  These include 
obtaining the data necessary to develop experimentally based constitutive models for the NGNP 
construction materials.  Those models are the foundation of the inelastic design analyses specifically 
required by ASME B&PV Sect. III Division I Subsection NH.  Safety assessments, dependent on 
time-dependent flaw growth and the resulting leak rates from postulated pressure-boundary breaks, 
will require a flaw assessment procedure capable of reliably predicting crack-induced failures as well 
as the size and growth of the resulting opening in the pressure boundary.   
Additionally, materials data and extrapolation procedures must be developed and guidance 
provided to ensure that allowable operation period and range of stress and temperature for materials 
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of construction are extended to meet the proposed operating temperatures and lifetimes.  Creep-
fatigue rules are an area of particular concern for the materials and temperatures of interest and must 
be updated and validated.  Since IHX sections must operate at the full exit temperature of the reactor, 
effort should be initiated to obtain data supporting the determination of the metallurgical stability and 
environmental resistance of IHX materials in anticipated impure helium coolant environments for the 
lifetimes anticipated.  Several materials-related phenomena related to the IHX were identified as 
having a high importance for potentially contributing to FP release at the site boundary and a low 
level of knowledge with which to assess their contribution to such a release.  Therefore, work should 
be initiated early to quantify crack initiation and propagation (due to creep crack growth, creep, 
creep-fatigue, and aging). 
6.3.2 Intermediate and Long Term 
Specific issues must be addressed for RPVs that are too large for shop fabrication and 
transportation.  Validated procedures for on-site welding, PWHT, and inspections must be developed 
for the materials of construction.  For vessels using materials other than those typical of LWR 
construction to enable operation at higher temperatures, confirmation of their fabricability (especially, 
effects of forging size and weldability) and data on their irradiation resistance is needed. Three 
materials-related phenomena related to the RPV fabrication and operation were identified as having a 
high importance for potentially contributing to FP release at the site boundary and a low level of 
knowledge with which to assess their contribution to such a release, particularly for 9Cr–1 Mo–V 
steels capable of higher-temperature operation than LWR vessel carbon steels. Aspects needing 
attention include crack initiation and subcritical crack growth, field fabrication process control, and 
property control in heavy sections.  
In addition, for high-temperature metals technology, there is a need for analytical models, in 
particular for developing time-dependent design criteria for complex structures, along with 
verification by structural testing.  ASME Code-approved simplified methods have not yet been 
proven and are not permitted for compact IHX components. 
Analytical modeling of carbon-carbon composite behavior would be useful in developing 
approved methods for designing, proof testing, model standard testing, validation tests, and 
probabilistic methods of design.  Scalability and fabrication issues must be addressed. Large-scale 
(meters in diameter) structures as well as smaller ones must be covered.  
6.4 SUMMARY 
Technology gaps for NGNP reactor materials (excluding graphite), which exist in the following 
areas, correspond directly to those identified by the PIRT panel: 
• RPV crack initiation and subcritical crack growth, 
• RPV surface emissivity and loss of desired surface layer properties, 
• RPV material properties degradation during field fabrication, 
• RPV material property control in heavy sections, 
• aging fatigue and environmental degradation of insulation materials, 
• IHX crack initiation and propagation, 
• structural design methods of control rod composites, 
• in-vessel surface emissivities, 
• irradiation-induced creep in in-vessel metallic structures, 
• composites structural design and fabrication methods for radial restraint structures, 
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• environmental and irradiation degradation and thermal stability of fibrous insulation, and 
• valve failure mechanisms for high-temperature conditions. 
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7. GRAPHITE 
Background information on graphite development and testing issues for the core, reflectors, and 
major structural components are provided in this section.  Also noted is how this material is to be 
adapted to the special very high-temperature and irradiation conditions peculiar to modular HTGR 
service (other high-temperature materials are covered in Sect. 6).  The phenomena influencing reactor 
safety (from the PIRT exercises) are described and addressed for each of the significant areas.  When 
gaps are noted, data needs are compared with available data and analysis tools.  Solutions for 
addressing the gaps are noted where appropriate.  More information about the phenomena identified 
as technology gaps is found in the report of the results of the PIRT process [1-1]. 
7.1 MAJOR PHENOMENA OF INTEREST 
For graphite, the most significant technology and data gaps relate to the lack of confirmatory data 
for the grades of graphite selected by potential NGNP vendors.  This situation has occurred because 
the graphite grades used in prior HTGRs are no longer available, and thus development of new grades 
has been required.  Other data gaps identified relate to the increased temperature of the NGNP 
compared to prior graphite-moderated reactors, or, in the case of the PBR, the larger neutron dose that 
the core components will experience compared to that of previous HTGRs licensed in the United 
States. 
Another gap is related to the lack of consensus codes and standards.  Efforts are under way 
through the ASME to develop a consensus design code for graphite core components, but to date a 
useable code has not been approved.  ASTM test standards exist for many of the physical properties 
of concern to the reactor designer, but further work is required, especially in the area of small 
(irradiation) specimen test methods.  
The phenomena ranked by the PIRT panel with high importance and low or medium knowledge 
bases are of the utmost concern and should have the highest priority for research effort.  Similarly, 
phenomena with a medium importance rank and low or medium knowledge base are of concern and 
should have moderate priority for research effort.  
Thus, the following phenomena represent the most significant technology/data gaps for graphite 
based on their high importance ranking with only a low or medium knowledge ranking. 
7.1.1 Phenomena Ranked Importance—High, Knowledge—Low 
Irradiation-Induced Creep (Irradiation-Induced Dimensional Change under Stress)  
Stress due to differential thermal strain and differential irradiation-induced dimensional changes 
would very quickly cause fracture in the graphite components if it were not for the stress relief due to 
irradiation-induced creep.  The phenomena and mechanism of irradiation-induced creep in graphite is 
therefore of high importance.  Currently, there are no creep data for the graphite grades being 
proposed for use in the NGNP.  However, creep at low dose follows a linear law, which can be 
explained through a dislocation pinning/unpinning model from Kelly and Foreman [7-1].  Marked 
deviation from this law has been observed at intermediate neutron doses.  The applicability of this law 
has been extended by taking into account changes in the pore structure that manifest themselves as 
changes in the coefficient of thermal expansion (CTE) with creep strain [7-2].  However, the current 
creep law breaks down at high-temperature, moderate-dose and moderate-temperature, high-dose 
combinations.  A new model for creep is needed which can account for the observed deviations from 
linearity of the creep strain rate with neutron dose.  Existing and new models need to be shown to be 
applicable to the currently proposed graphite grades.  Knowledge rank was therefore considered low.  
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Irradiation-Induced Change in CTE, including the Effects of Creep Strain 
Differential thermal strains occur in graphite components due to temperature gradients and local 
variation in the CTE.  The CTE variations are dependent upon the irradiation conditions (temperature 
and dose) and the irradiation-induced creep strain [7-2 through 7-5].  Thus the importance ranking is 
high for this phenomenon.  Irradiation-induced changes in CTE are understood to be related to 
changes in the oriented porosity in the graphite structure.  These changes are observed to be different 
when graphite is placed under load (stress) during irradiation.  The direction and magnitude of the 
stress (and the creep strain) affect the extent of the CTE change.  There are insufficient data available 
for the effect of creep strain on CTE in graphite.  Moreover, none of the available data are for the 
grades proposed for the NGNP.  Thus the knowledge rank is low. 
Irradiation-Induced Changes in Mechanical Properties (Strength, Toughness), Including the 
Effect of Creep Strain (Stress) 
Graphite properties are known to change with neutron irradiation, the extent of which is a 
function of the neutron dose, irradiation temperature, and irradiation-induced creep strain.  Local 
differences in moduli, strength, and toughness due to neutron fluence and temperature gradients must 
be accounted for in design.  The importance of this phenomenon is thus ranked high.  Although data 
exist for the effect of neutron dose and temperature on the mechanical properties of graphite, there are 
insufficient data on the effects of creep strain on the mechanical properties.  Moreover, none of the 
available data are for the grades currently being considered for the NGNP.  Knowledge ranking is 
therefore low.   
Blockage of Coolant Channel in a Fuel Element Block or a Reactivity Control Block Due to 
Graphite Failure and/or Graphite Spalling. 
Significant uncertainty exists as to the stress state of any graphite component in the core.  
Moreover, the strength of the components changes with dose, temperature, and creep strain.  The 
combination of these factors makes the probability of local failure, graphite spalling, and possible 
blockage of a coolant channel in a fuel element block or a reactivity control block difficult to 
determine.  Consequently the panel rated this phenomenon’s importance as high.  Although the 
changes in properties of graphite have been studied for many years, there are still data gaps that make 
whole-core modeling very difficult (e.g., effect of creep strain on properties).  Moreover, data on the 
grades selected for NGNP are not available.  Therefore, the panel rated the knowledge base for this 
phenomenon as low.  A related concern would be for a blockage that interferes with the ability to 
insert control or safety rods.  In this case the panel rated the knowledge base as medium. 
7.1.2 Phenomena Ranked Importance—High, Knowledge—Medium 
Statistical Variation of Nonirradiated Properties 
The graphite single crystal is highly anisotropic due to the nature of its bonding (strong covalent 
bonds between the carbon atoms in the basal plane and weak van der Waals bonds between basal 
planes).  This anisotropy is transferred to the filler coke particles and also to the crystalline regions 
converted by graphitization in the binder phase.  Thus, the mechanical and physical properties of 
graphite vary within a billet due to texture introduced during forming and thermal processing 
(graphitization).  Moreover, there is a statistical variability in the properties between billets within the 
same lots, between lots, and between batches due to variations in raw materials, formulations, and 
processing conditions.  Therefore it is necessary to develop a statistical data base of the properties for 
a given graphite grade.  The variations in chemical properties (chemical purity level) will have 
implications for chemical attack, degradation, and decommissioning).  Probabilistic design 
approaches are best suited to capturing the variability of graphite.  The panel rated the importance of 
this phenomenon high.  Although other nuclear graphites have been characterized and full databases 
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developed, allowing an understanding to be established of the textural variations, only limited data 
exists on the graphites proposed for the NGNP.  Therefore the panel rated this phenomenon’s 
knowledge level as medium.  
Consistency in Graphite Quality Over the Lifetime of the Reactor Fleet (for Replacement as an 
Example) 
Graphite is manufactured from cokes and pitches derived from naturally occurring organic 
sources such as oil and coal (in the form of coal tar pitch).  These sources are subject to geological 
variations and depletion, requiring the substitution of alternate sources.  Therefore, the consistency of 
graphite quality and properties over the lifetime of a reactor, or the reactor fleet (for replacement, for 
example), is of concern.  The panel ranked the importance of this phenomenon as high.  Our 
understanding of this phenomenon is sufficient to develop generic specifications [ASTM DO2.F, 
D 7219-05] which should ensure quality and repeatability.  However, this has not been proven, 
especially due to the lack of irradiated properties data.  The panel assessed the knowledge base for 
this phenomenon as medium. 
Irradiation-Induced Dimensional Change  
Neutron irradiation causes dimensional changes in graphites.  These changes are the result of 
anisotropic crystal dimensional change rates (a-axis shrinkage and c-axis growth), the interaction of 
crystal dimensional change with porosity, and the generation of new voids and porosity.  The amount 
of irradiation-induced dimensional change is a function of the neutron dose and irradiation 
temperature.  Consequently, gradients in temperature or neutron dose will introduce differential 
dimensional changes (strains).  Irradiation-induced dimensional changes are the largest source of 
“internal stress,” as opposed to the external load that is applied due to service conditions).  Because of 
the significance of dimensional changes in generating core stresses, the panel gave this phenomenon 
high importance.  Irradiation-induced dimensional changes have been researched for many years, and 
several dimensional change models have been proposed.  However, there is a paucity of data for the 
dimensional changes of the graphites proposed for the NGNP.  Therefore, the knowledge rank was 
considered medium.   
Irradiation-Induced Thermal Conductivity Change 
Displacement damage caused by neutron irradiation introduces additional phonon scattering sites 
to the graphite crystal lattice and consequently reduces the thermal conductivity.  The nature of the 
irradiation-induced damage is sensitive to the temperature of irradiation.  Consequently, the extent of 
degradation is temperature dependent.  In addition, phonon–phonon (Umklapp) scattering increases as 
the measurement temperature increases and, thus, the thermal conductivity decreases as the 
temperature increases.  At very high irradiation doses, thermal conductivity decreases further, at an 
increased rate, attributed to porosity generation due to large crystal dimensional change. The thermal 
conductivity is also subject to some recovery (annealing) on heating above the irradiation temperature 
(such as during an accident thermal transient).  The exact thermal conductivity under all core 
conditions is therefore subject to some uncertainty.  Thermal conductivities lower than that required 
by the design basis for licensing-basis-event heat removal due to (a) inadequate database to support 
design over the component lifetime or (b) statistical and textural variations in characteristics of 
graphites from lot-to-lot have the potential to allow fuel design temperature limits to be exceeded 
during licensing basis events.  The importance of this phenomenon was therefore considered high.  
Irradiation-induced thermal conductivity changes have been researched for many years, and several 
conductivity change models have been proposed.  However, there is a paucity of data for the 
conductivity changes of the graphites proposed for the NGNP.  Therefore the knowledge rank was 
considered medium.   
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Irradiation-Induced Changes in Elastic Constants, Including the Effects of Creep Strain 
Neutron irradiation induces changes in the elastic constants of graphite.  Initial increases in the 
moduli are attributed to an increase in dislocation pinning points in the basal plane, which reduce the 
crystal shear compliance, C44.  Subsequent changes in the elastic moduli are attributed to pore-
structure changes (initial pore closures followed by pore generation). Although the understanding of 
irradiation-induced moduli changes is well developed, there are no direct microstructural observations 
or sufficiently well-developed models of these mechanisms.  Therefore, the knowledge rank was 
considered medium.   
Tribology of Graphite in (Impure) Helium Environments 
Graphite is a naturally lubricious material.  However, its behavior can be modified by the helium 
environment of the NGNP.  The abrasion of graphite blocks on one another or of the fuel pebbles on 
the graphite moderator blocks could produce graphite dust.  Studies are needed to assess the effect of 
the helium environment on the friction and wear behavior of graphite.  The possibility that fuel balls 
can “stick together” and cause a fuel-flow blockage must be explored, although German pebble-bed 
experience was positive in this regard (i.e., no significant blockages).  The consequences of dust 
generation (as a possible FPT mechanism) and possible fuel ball interactions resulted in the panel 
ranking the importance of this phenomenon as high.  The limited literature on this subject is primarily 
from the past German program.  Consequently the panel ranked the knowledge level as medium.   
Degradation of Thermal Conductivity  
The degradation of thermal conductivity in graphite components has implications for fuel 
temperature limits during loss-of-forced-cooling accidents.   
7.2 PHYSICAL AND SUPPORTING MODEL ASPECTS 
Theoretical models for the effects of neutron damage on the properties of graphite have been 
developed.  However, these models need modification for the new graphites and will need to be 
extended to higher temperatures and/or higher neutron doses.  V&V of theoretical models can only 
come through the generation of experimental data on the effect of neutron irradiation on properties.  
Experimental data to fill the data gaps must be generated in a technology development program.  The 
biggest gaps are related to predicting the buildup in stress in graphite core components.  Uncertainties 
in the temperature and dose received by a component; the severity of temperature and dose gradients 
in a component; the rate of dimensional change in the specific graphite used in a given design; the 
extent to which stresses are relieved by irradiation-induced creep; and the extent of changes in key 
physical properties such as elastic moduli, thermal conductivity, coefficient of thermal expansion, 
etc., all compound to make the prediction of component stress levels, and hence decisions regarding 
component lifetime and replacement schedules, very imprecise.  
7.3 CLOSING THE GAPS—STAGES OF MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
7.3.1 Near Term 
Confirmatory data are needed to show that new graphites behave in a similar fashion to the older 
graphites upon which the current understanding and knowledge is based.  Given the similarity, 
existing models can be applied to the new graphite grades. 
7.3.2 Intermediate and Long Term 
Current models need to be extended to higher temperatures and neutron irradiation dose as 
required for NGNP designs.  This effort includes improving the existing graphite creep model, which 
has been shown to break down at large neutron doses (beyond volume turnaround). 
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Additionally, whole-core models are required that can predict the stress states of graphite 
components within the core.  Such models should be capable of taking inputs such as temperature and 
neutron dose and calculating the dimensional change, creep, thermal conductivity, etc., from 
established theoretical models.  Reliable stress-state predictions as a function of reactor life would 
enable reactor operators and regulators to provide NDE guidance and make decisions regarding 
inspection intervals and core block replacement. 
Basic research should be conducted to strengthen the understanding and modeling capability of 
the displacement damage process in graphite.  Many theoretical models are based on assumptions 
regarding the graphite lattice defect (vacancy) structure that develops upon irradiation.  The nature of 
the defect structure is known to be temperature dependent and has a marked effect upon the 
irradiation properties of graphite.  Advances in the resolution of electron microscopes and 
development in ab initio predictions allow molecular-dynamics simulations of the defective structure 
of irradiated graphite.  These simulations are the starting point for new multiscale models of graphite 
structure that could predict property changes on irradiation in graphite.  In addition, in graphite 
technology, there is a need for analytical models.  These models will be developed as part of the 
NGNP program.  The models will be for oxidation, changes in physical properties, irradiation induced 
dimensional change, and irradiation creep.  They will feed into a structural integrity model (code) for 
the graphite core which will be used for core design and safety assessment. 
7.4 SUMMARY 
Technology gaps for graphite, which exist in the following areas, correspond directly to those 
identified by the PIRT panel: 
• graphite supply (coke sources, graphite vendors); 
• confirmatory data for new grades being considered for the NGNP; 
• irradiation creep data and effect of creep on properties of candidate NGNP graphites; 
• consensus design codes and materials testing standards; 
• extension of current theoretical models to higher doses and temperatures; 
• development of improved understanding and models for neutron irradiation induced 
displacement damage in graphite; 
• development of whole-core structural models; 
• NDE methods for use in and out of core; and 
• graphite analytical models for oxidation, property changes, and dimensional changes and 
creep induced by irradiation. 
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8. PROCESS HEAT 
The gap analysis for the process heat sector suffers from a major information gap, that being that 
the process heat sector of NGNP has been defined only as a means of producing hydrogen, employing 
~10% of the reactor thermal power.  No specific chemical process had been defined for hydrogen 
production. However, candidate hydrogen production processes with potential safety implications 
were defined in the PIRT process, and background information on these processes is provided in this 
section.  The phenomena influencing reactor (as opposed to process heat plant) safety are described 
and addressed for each of the significant areas selected.  Solutions for addressing the gaps are noted 
where appropriate.  More information about the phenomena identified as technology gaps is found in 
the report of the results of the PIRT process [8-1]. 
8.1 MAJOR PHENOMENA OF INTEREST 
The events and the associated phenomena of high importance identified in the PIRT include the 
following. 
• Cold oxygen (O2) and other heavy-gas accidental releases from the process plant that can 
flow from the chemical plant to the nuclear plant (depending upon wind, relative plant 
elevations, and nuclear plant air intakes) and potentially impact the integrity of reactor 
systems, structures, and components (SSCs). All of the proposed processes for production 
of hydrogen start with water, and thus all of the processes will produce oxygen as a by-
product of hydrogen production. Oxygen is the one common chemical safety issue that 
can impact nuclear plant safety.  At high oxygen concentrations, many “noncombustible” 
materials become combustible and the potential for spontaneous combustion increases. 
Increased oxygen levels at the reactor can compromise the functioning of safety 
equipment. The knowledge level for these phenomena is medium based on the 
uncertainty in the maturity of the designs to allow complete assessment of vulnerabilities.  
• Failure of the IHX leading to potential damage to safety-related SSCs in the reactor due 
to blow-down effects from large mass transfer and over-pressurization of either 
secondary or primary side. The knowledge level for these phenomena is medium based 
on the uncertainty in the maturity of the designs to allow complete assessment of 
vulnerabilities. The impact of the IHX failure depends upon the selection of the heat 
transfer fluid in the secondary heat transport loop. Helium is the leading candidate for the 
heat transport loop, but no final decisions have been made. If helium is used, the helium 
inventory in the secondary loop may be greater than the inventory in the reactor; thus, 
any leak in the IHX can significantly increase the total helium inventory involved in any 
reactor depressurization event. 
• Failure of the process heat exchanger (PHX) leading to potential damage to safety-related 
SSCs in the reactor due to fuel and primary system corrosion from the introduction of 
corrosive process plant chemicals leaking down the process heat transport line and failing 
the IHX.  The knowledge level for these phenomena is medium based on the uncertainty 
in the maturity of the designs to allow complete assessment of vulnerabilities. 
• Steam generator failures leading to the introduction of steam/water into the primary 
system, potentially causing a reactivity spike and chemical attack of the TRISO fuel 
particle coatings and graphite. The knowledge level for these phenomena is medium 
based on the uncertainty in the maturity of the designs to allow complete assessment of 
vulnerabilities. Some hydrogen production processes, such as high-temperature 
electrolysis, require steam as a process feedstock; thus, the high-temperature reactor may 
be required to provide high-temperature steam.  
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• Loss of the pressurized coolant inventory from the intermediate loop leading to a loss of 
primary reactor heat sink and the potential for hydrodynamic forces on the IHX leading 
to IHX failure and loss of reactor primary system coolant. The knowledge level for these 
phenomena is medium based on the uncertainty in the maturity of the designs to allow 
complete assessment of vulnerabilities. 
The PIRT did not rate phenomena associated hydrogen releases as of high importance. Industrial 
experience, experiments, and theory indicate that hydrogen leaks and accidents have limited impacts 
beyond the chemical plant because of the extremely high buoyancy and diffusivity of hydrogen.  
8.2 EXPERIMENTAL AND ANALYTICAL MODELING OF PHENOMENA 
The design of the reactor, the process plant, and the intermediate loop needs to consider the 
events and phenomena of high importance as listed above, but the need for experiments or analytical 
tools will depend on the hydrogen production processes that are selected and design details.  In most 
cases, proper civil and chemical engineering of the two plants and the intermediate loop can be used 
to eliminate, minimize, or mitigate the possibility of challenging accidents.  Distance, relative 
elevation, and the selection of noncorrosive, nonhydrogenous intermediate loop working fluid with 
fast-acting, passive (reverse flow) isolation valves can mitigate the potential for most of the 
phenomena cited above. The one area that may require further assessment, independent of the specific 
hydrogen production process, is the release of the by-product oxygen.  
8.3 CLOSING THE GAPS—STAGES OF MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
No specific plant model development is required at this time beyond the application of reasonable 
engineering judgment, tools, and lessons-learned from chemical plant experience to eliminate or 
minimize the possibility of accidents affecting both the reactor and the process heat plant. 
8.4 SUMMARY 
Potential phenomena resulting from process plant interface with the reactor are highly design 
dependent.  As was also concluded in the PIRT study [8-1], the design selections should be guided to 
eliminate or minimize the phenomena that can adversely affect reactor safety. 
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